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A. BACKGROUND  
On December 18, 2001, Romania's Parliament approved the new National 
Security Strategy. It is a fundamental, official work that re-emphasized the importance of 
strengthening the country's existing democratic institutions and the desire to integrate into 
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) structures as a full member, with all the 
attendant rights and obligations.  As a proof of the Romanian leaders' commitment to 
provide immediate security benefits to NATO, and despite the difficulties inherent in the 
necessary economic transition and the reform of the Armed Forces, in 2003, 
approximately 2,000 military personnel were deployed, mainly in the former Yugoslavia, 
Afghanistan, and Iraq. 
Today Romania is a NATO member, and it continues its efforts to fully 
modernize and professionalize the country’s military.  The new Defense White Paper of 
the Government ensures stable budgetary support for the Ministry of Defense, while the 
military leaders explore options for the Romanian Armed Forces to improve their 
contribution to the Euro-Atlantic security.  In doing so, in 2003, the military decision 
makers also tried to establish the foundations of a Romanian Special Forces (ROSF) 
capability.  Central to that new organization was the 1st Romanian Special Forces 
Battalion, which was expected to become a strategic-level instrument destined to address 
key challenges posed by the post-9/11 security environment. 
B. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
Taking into consideration that by FY 2007 the entire SF Battalion and the other 
elements belonging to ROSF are to be operationally ready, the purpose of this project is 
to explore the proper missions and organizational structure for ROSF.  In general, due to 
their intrinsic nature, Special Forces can provide the National Command Authority 
strategic utility in terms of economy of force and expansion of options.  At the same time, 
however, failed special operations may lead to a loss of international prestige and affect 
the country’s morale.  Because ROSF is a young defense organization that is still 
developing its own identity, determining appropriate tasks and structural arrangements 
constitute the first two steps required to pave the way toward future successes. 
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Appropriate tasks for ROSF refer to those missions that are adapted to Romania’s 
security imperatives, which cannot be successfully addressed by the county’s General 
Purpose Forces (GPF) or other agencies, and abiding by the principles that make Special 
Forces special.  Given these conditions, the method presented in this thesis shows that 
ROSF should focus their training solely on Combating Terrorism (CBT), 
Counterproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Special Reconnaissance (SR), 
Direct Action (DA), and Security Detail for Romanian officials who may visit combat or 
crisis zones. 
Carrying out such complex missions, in addition to conceptual and financial 
adjustments, which are not covered in this thesis, requires important organizational 
changes.  The conclusions that come out of this project indicate that ROSF should 
develop into a centralized and joint SF service, with a flat hierarchy and organic aviation 
assets.  By adopting this flexible organizational configuration and acquiring proficiency 
in the fields related to its missions, ROSF will be able to conduct special operations, both 
independently inside Romania and, during deployments, with Allied forces in combined 
scenarios. 
C. METHODOLOGY 
John Collins’ framework significantly assisted in reaching the conclusions 
concerning assignment of ROSF’s tasks.  He was a paratroop colonel who served with 
Special Operations Task Force Europe, authored numerous books and studies on defense-
related issues, and acted as an informal consultant to top decision makers within the U.S. 
Congress and Department of Defense.  By adopting and applying his method, ROSF’s 
tasks have been associated with Romania’s strategic documents, and they have been 
separated from tasks applicable to conventional forces or other functions security services 
can or should conduct 
From the literature pertaining to organizational theory, Rich Burton and Borge 
Öbel’s work that attempts to synthesize decades of research in the field of designing 
effective organizations has been examined.  The scholars have implemented a related 
software application, Organizational Consultant, which is a design program that assesses 
an organization’s health and provides recommendations for its improvement.  Using this 
software, a diagnosis of ROSF’s organizational characteristics has been conducted and 
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presented in this thesis with several accompanying recommendations concerning the 
organization’s structural arrangements. 
Finally, based on the application of the authors’ theoretical approach, and strongly 
supported by the results of a short analysis of two case studies, a proposed configuration 
for ROSF has been reached.  Indeed, looking at the U.S. Joint Special Operations 
Command (JSOC) and the British Special Forces Group – two well-oiled military 
organizations with attributions in the CBT area – it is shown that the theoretical 
prescriptions dealing with ROSF’s proposed configuration are congruent with the 
structural changes recorded in the two Allied organizations’ pasts. 
D. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
Chapter II begins by underscoring some similarities between the current 
Romanian Special Operations Doctrine and the U.S. doctrine in the field of special 
operations.  Each U.S. doctrinal mission is briefly examined and associated with higher 
defense policy goals.  Emulating the U.S. Special Operations community’s approach, 
Christopher Lamb’s modified framework is presented at the end of the chapter, which 
will be invaluable in assisting ROSF in identifying missions that will invariably support 
the country’s defense policy. 
Chapter III applies Lamb’s method to the Romanian Special Forces case.  The 
section presents, in detail, the Euro-Atlantic security environment to which Romania is 
intimately associated, examines the country’s National Security Strategy and Defense 
White Paper, and finally discusses and decides on the sharing of strategic missions 
among General Purpose Forces or other security agencies, and the Special Forces. 
Approaching the issue from two different directions, Chapter IV reaches the same 
conclusions regarding the most appropriate structural arrangement for ROSF.  
Organizational theory concepts are exploited, with the assistance of software included in 
the Organizational Consultant design program, and the resultant findings are presented 
and are shown to be reinforced by the lessons learned from the JSOC and the British 
Special Forces’ organizational practice. 
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The concluding chapter summarizes the questions raised in this project and the 
proposed solutions, discusses their implications in leading ROSF’s organizational 
transformation, and details the larger significance of this project. 
E. LIMITATIONS 
The analysis conducted with the assistance of the Organizational Consultant 
software focused solely on ROSF’s organizational structure, and did not consider 
recommendations pertaining to climate, management style, and technology.  The Annex 
comprises the program’s full Report Summary, and provides a basis for future research. 
Although the configuration of ROSF has represented the second priority of this 
thesis, only a few points have been made regarding the appropriate structure at the 
bottom of the hierarchy.  For example, the debate continues over whether the 1st 
Romanian SF Battalion should adopt a 12-man U.S. SF Operational Detachment Alpha 
(ODA) configuration.  While this ODA structure fits the U.S. Army SF core task – 
Unconventional Warfare – the Romanian SF Battalion might consider emulating the U.S. 
Delta Force or SEAL configuration, or the British Special Air Service or Special Boat 
Service configuration, who all focus more on CBT, SR, or DA missions, and tend to use 
fighting patrols with less than 12 members. 
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II. THE QUESTION OF SOF TASKING 
Daft (2003) provides the definition used in this thesis to describe organizations: 
“organizations are (1) social entities that (2) are goal directed, (3) are designed as 
deliberately structured and coordinated activity systems, and (4) are linked to the external 
environment.” (p. 4)  In this chapter we will focus on the second element of the definition 
because, as Burton & Öbel (1998) point out, the first step in organizational design is to 
establish the organization’s goals and missions (p.13). 
Again, since the ultimate purpose of this work is to propose a credible new design 
for the Romanian SF (ROSF) structure, any effort in this direction should start by 
addressing the question of tasking.  Thus, the core concern in this section is How can one 
determine what should be the missions for ROSF?  A brief analysis of ROSF and U.S. 
SOF missions uncovers obvious similarities.  The choices that the U.S. SOF has made in 
terms of roles and functions mirror the organization’s efforts to support U.S. defense 
policy goals.  They result from more than fifty years of complex organizational history 
(Garrison, 1995, p. 17). 
By contrast, ROSF was established in 2003, and its tasks have not been yet 
methodically adapted to the country’s new NATO-member status.  The aspiration to 
correlate Romania’s newly gained position and ROSF’s tasks has eventually led us to 
adopt Christopher Lamb’s perspective on appropriate SOF tasking. 
After comparing the two countries’ approaches to the SOF field with an emphasis 
on clarifying some SOF-related jargon, we briefly provide details about all U.S. SOF 
doctrinal missions, and attempt to appreciate their complexity.  Finally, we introduce 
Lamb’s model that seeks to ensure that ROSF appropriate tasks will support the country’s 
defense policy goals. 
A. A COMPARISON BETWEEN ROMANIAN AND U.S. SOF TASKS 
In February 2002, Romanian military leaders decided to develop a Special Forces 
Capability as part of the country’s military transformation and NATO integration 
processes.  The Allies in NATO welcomed the decision since the need for more SF units 
in the Alliance already had been acknowledged, and specialized elite elements from 
many countries already had proven their utility in the Global War on Terror (GWT). 
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During the last two years, a number of U.S. military officials have assisted in the 
foundation of the new Romanian Special Forces Battalion, which has been facilitated by 
offering school slots for the Special Forces Qualification Course and at the Ranger 
Course in the U.S.  They also provided a number of reference materials and documents in 
order to help the future SF unit prepare and train in accordance with U.S. military 
doctrine.  The result, in April 2003, was the creation of Romania’s 1st Special Forces 
Battalion, which mirrors the current organizational structure of a U.S. SF Battalion and, 
by doctrine, is assigned the same basic missions as American SOF. 
According to the Romanian Special Operations Doctrine (2003), “special 
operations are small scale decisive actions, covert or clandestine, involving high risk 
and/or an unconventional nature1, conducted by a specialized component of the Armed 
Forces – the Special Forces – inside or outside the country, during peacetime, crises, or 
war, in order to defend Romania’s fundamental interests.” (p. 7). 
Special Forces include a command structure subordinated to the Chief of General 
Staff; a land component comprising the 1st SF Battalion and disparate elements such as 
reconnaissance, paratroopers, infantry, mountain troops, NBC, engineers, 
communications, psychological operations, and logistical support; a supporting air 
component with fighters, bombers, rotary-wing assets, and transportation aircraft; and a 
supporting naval component that includes SEAL-type elements, and transportation boats 
(p. 12). 
As shown in Table 1, by doctrine, ROSF is expected to carry out tasks that are 
nearly identical to those assigned to the U.S. SOF.  Indeed, the Romanian doctrinal 
document reveals all nine U.S. SOF core tasks except Civil Affairs Operations, which in 
Romania is considered a conventional mission2 (Paul, 2004).  The order in which the 
principal missions are mentioned markedly differs, reflecting differences in perceptions 
regarding mission priority.  Also worth considering is the broader approach to terrorism 
                                                 
1 Doctrinally, unconventional operations include: organize, train, equip, support, and direct indigenous 
forces or ad hoc elements in order to conduct guerilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence collection, 
or escape and evasion. 
2 In Romania, as within NATO military structures, civil affairs (CA) or civil-military cooperation 
elements belong to the General Purpose Forces.  Moreover, in Romania, CA assets have a coordinating 
body subordinated to J5, and create their own doctrine separate from the special operations community. 
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on the Romanian side, since Combating Terrorism (CBT) includes both CT (offensive 
countermeasures) and antiterrorism (AT) (passive protection). 
Finally, it is difficult not to observe the similarities regarding collateral tasks (still 
missions on the Romanian side versus tasks or activities for U.S. SOF), where there is 
almost perfect mirroring, with the only additional collateral mission being Strategic 
Objectives Security (SOS) for the Romanian SF. 
 
Table 1. Romanian SF and American SOF missions 
(After Romanian SO Doctrine) 
 
Romanian Special Forces American Special Operations Forces 
Principal missions Core tasks 
1. Special Reconnaissance (SR) 1. Counterterrorism (CT) 
2. Direct Action (DA) 2. Counterproliferation of WMD 
3. Foreign Internal Defense (FID) 3. Special Reconnaissance 
4. Unconventional Warfare (UW) 4. Direct Action 
5. Combating Terrorism (CBT) 5. Unconventional Warfare 
6. Psychological Operations (PSYOP) 6. Information Operations 
7. Counterproliferation (CP) of WMD 7. Psychological Operations 
8. Information Operations (IO) 8. Foreign Internal Defense 
 9. Civil Affairs Operations (CAO) 
Collateral Missions Collateral Activities 
1. Coalition Support 1. Coalition Support 
2. Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) 2. Combat Search and Rescue 
3. Counterdrug (CD) Activities 3. Counterdrug Activities 
4. Countermine (CM) Activities 4. Countermine Activities 
5. Humanitarian Assistance (HA) 5. Humanitarian Assistance 
6. Security Assistance 6. Security Assistance 
7. Special Activities 7. Special Activities 
8. Strategic Objectives Security  
 
A deeper look at the Romanian SO doctrine would reveal that the Romanian SF 
community comprises an ad hoc mix of elements belonging to each service which do not 
all exemplify the definition and characteristics of Special Forces mentioned in the 
guiding reference manuals offered by the U.S. Allies. 
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It also appears that there is no distinction between Special Forces and Special 
Operations Forces, which indicates that the U.S. doctrinal works have not been 
completely understood. 
B. U.S. SOF ESTABLISHMENT 
United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is a defense 
organization with a $7 billion budget (“SOF Posture”, 2003, p. 89), approximately 49,000 
personnel (pp. 90-91), and over 4,900 SOF operators deployed around the world in any 
given week (p. 39). 
The SOF community is a very diverse joint team comprising active duty officers 
and enlisted personnel (over 31,000), National Guard operators (over 3,700), personnel 
from the Reserve (more than 11,000), and civilians (over 3,300) (p. 91).  These SOF 
operators and civilians are managed by the USSOCOM that has two main missions: (1) to 
plan and execute special operations using assets from subordinate SOF organizations 
(i.e., Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command, Special Forces Command, 
the 75th Ranger Regiment, the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, or Special 
Operations Support Command); and (2) to organize, train, and equip SOF provided to six 
Geographic Combatant Commanders (Pacific, Central, Europe, South, North, and Korea). 
For concerns of clarity, it might be useful to emphasize at this point that the U.S. 
Army Special Forces (ARSF) (most commonly known as the Green Berets) fall into the 
general category of SOF, as do, for instance, Air Force, Civil Affairs, SEAL, or 
psychological operations personnel serving under USSOCOM or geographic Special 
Operations Commands.  This distinction becomes important because unlike in the U.S., 
the European defense establishments and Romania tend to use SF and SOF 
interchangeably. 
While U.S. Special Operation Forces comprise active duty and Reserve 
component forces of the Military Services that are designated by the Secretary of Defense 
and specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support the sixteen tasks 
mentioned in Table 1 (Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, 1998, p. viii), Special 
Forces encompass those U.S. Army forces subordinated to USSOCOM that are 
organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct five primary missions: UW, FID, 
DA, SR, and CT (“SOF Posture”, 2003, p. 114). 
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However, we need to warn the reader of the disagreement that still exists 
occasionally within the U. S. special operations community as to what makes SOF 
special, or whether they ought to be ‘shooters or social workers’ (Adams, 1998, p. 8).  
Comparing the USSOCOM definition of special operations with the Army Special Forces 
Command’s (USASOC) definition, Adams (1998) uncovers a division of opinion.  While 
the former emphasizes that SOF are special because they have unique equipment and 
conduct tasks that exceed the routine capabilities of General-Purpose Forces (GPF) (the 
tasks and methods being, by implication, conventional); the latter stresses SOF use of 
unconventional means for political, economic or informational objectives beyond military 
ones (pp. 7-8).  Are SOF essentially conventional soldiers with a very high degree of 
proficiency, tailored high technology equipment, and training not available to GPF?  Or 
are they unconventional operators dedicated to roles and using methods that are different 
than the ones associated with the conventional military forces? 
By emulating the U.S. Doctrine, ROSF also accepted this dilemma, which reflects 
the complex dual nature of USSOCOM, and a real divergence of opinion within the SOF 
community “about the nature, purpose, functions, and methods of special operations 
forces.” (p. 8) 
C. A BROAD SPECTRUM OF POSSIBLE SOF MISSIONS 
In an attempt to clarify some nuances related to each U.S. SOF task and offer a 
glimpse of their spirit and the context, the following paragraphs briefly expand doctrinal 
definitions of SOF missions, which are basically identical for both U.S. and Romanian 
SOF establishments (Special Operations Doctrine, 2003, pp. 13-19).  According to 
Adams (1998), the list of SOF missions: 
…is a hodge-podge of conventional, unconventional and just plain odd 
missions, some of which are actually subsets of others.  The list results in 
part from a general willingness at the command levels of the SOF 
community to accept almost any mission as one in which SOF can 
succeed.  There is an idea that, by accepting many missions, SOF 
demonstrates its fitness and remains competitive with other organizations 
in the struggle for a share of the diminishing military budget (p. 303). 
 
1. SOF Core Tasks 
The U.S. Special Operations Forces Posture Statement (2003) identifies nine 
enduring SOF core tasks that are relevant across the spectrum of conflict, expand the 
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options for the National Command Authorities, and account for a strategic economy of 
force (pp. 36-37).  All nine are addressed below: 
a. Counterterrorism 
 Striving to support the goals of the new U.S. Defense Strategy, after 
September 11, 2001, the U.S. SOF established CT as its first priority.  The task includes 
“offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism.” (p. 36)  
The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2003) proposes specific goals and 
objectives, many of which are supported by USSOCOM’s missions: 
1. Defeat terrorists and their organizations: identify, locate, and destroy them (pp. 
15-17) 
2. Deny sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists: cooperating with willing 
and able states, and compelling the unwilling ones; enabling weak states; interdict 
and disrupt material support for terrorists (pp. 17-21) 
3. Diminish the underlying conditions used by the terrorists: strengthen weak states, 
win the war of ideas (pp. 22-23). 
 The 2003 SOF Posture underscores SOF significance in meeting these 
goals and objectives through missions that include intelligence operations, hostage 
rescue, attacks against terrorist networks, and indirect activities designed to influence 
attitudes and motivations, and to discourage terrorism (role for PSYOP and CA) (p. 36). 
 According to Collins (1987), within the USSOCOM, the Delta Force, Seal 
Team 6, and the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment are the units that most 
emphasize the conduct of direct CT actions (p. 22). 
b. Counterproliferation of WMD 
 The U.S. National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(2002) states that “U.S. military and appropriate civilian agencies must possess the full 
range of operational capabilities to counter the threat and use of WMD by states and 
terrorists against the United States, our military forces, and friends and allies” (p. 2). 
In 2003, the SOF Posture claimed that U.S. SOF provided “unique 
capabilities to monitor and support” DOD’s policy in the areas of: prevention of 
acquisition of WMD, rolling back of proliferation where it has occurred, and deterrence 
of WMD use (p. 36). 
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 The commander of U.S. Pacific Command identified a list of 19 
counterproliferation requirements, some of which display clear applicability for SOF 
capabilities: conduct off-site and on-site attacks in order to destroy, disable and deny 
WMD targets; seize, destroy, disable, and deny transport of WMD, and rogue states or 
terrorists’ non-WMD resources; conduct IO in order to destroy, disable and deny WMD 
development, production, deployment, and employment; provide intelligence collection 
capabilities related to CP efforts; carry out Security Assistance activities by providing 
personnel, training, and equipment (“The Counterproliferation Imperative”, 2001, pp. 18-
20). 
 Addressing the WMD threat as a SOF peacetime challenge, Collins (2000) 
identified a number of specific possible roles for SOF: participate in interagency and 
international intelligence-collection plans with the mission to locate, identify and follow 
WMD-related items aboard ships and aircraft; collect water and soil samples in the 
vicinity of suspicious installations; or reinforce officially sanctioned searches such as 
those belonging to the United Nations (pp. 3-4). 
In a CP crisis situation, however, SOF would need different resources: 
state-of-the art infiltration platforms, lethal and non-lethal effects weapons, effective 
communications links, immediate access to fused intelligence, and elite soldiers with 
specialized training (Faulkner & Sayre, 1997, p. 23). 
c. Special Reconnaissance 
 SR is normally limited in scope and duration to tasks that aim at collecting 
or verifying information of strategic and operational significance on the enemy, terrain, 
and weather.  While strategic objectives are related to the attainment of national policy 
goals, operational objectives are of a theater value. 
Through visual observation or high technology collection methods, SR 
intends to obtain and report information that supports the commander’s decision making 
process.  For example, in 1990 in the Persian Gulf theater SEAL squads from Navy 
Special Warfare Group One maintained listening and observation posts in order to gather 
intelligence on the Iraqi movements along the Saudi Arabian-Kuwait border, and 
conducted hydrographic reconnaissance off the shores of Kuwait up to the beginning of 
Desert Storm (Dockery, 2003, pp. 212-218). 
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 According to Collins (1993), the contact of human-intelligence assets with 
resistance elements or insurgents in order to ascertain whether they deserve U.S. support 
(i.e., Northern Afghanistan in 2001 or Northern Iraq in 2003) also constitutes a typical 
strategic level reconnaissance task.  Differentiating between the SEALs’ specialization in 
SR along coasts and rivers and the Army’s SF inland SR, the same analyst argues that the 
employment of the later is debatable: 
Special Forces teams, composed mainly of seasoned, professional NCOs, 
are fully qualified to perform strategic-reconnaissance missions.  Their 
employment, however, risks hard to replace personnel who spend years 
acquiring language proficiency and cross-cultural understanding 
applicable to a particular geographic area. 
 
Therefore, Collins proposes two adjustments: the transformation of SR in 
a collateral activity for Army SF and the training and use of Ranger small intelligence-
collection teams for SR missions (p. 23). 
d. Direct Action 
 DA refers to short-duration and small-scale offensive actions against 
targets of strategic or operational significance that are out of reach for tactical weapons 
systems and conventional military capabilities.  Conducting such types of operations 
usually requires SOF operators to be capable of employing raid and ambush tactics, 
providing terminal guidance for precision guided munitions, or recovering personnel or 
material in hostile territory. 
In order to achieve decisive results at a predetermined time and place, DA 
missions focus on stealth, surprise, speed, and surgically precise application of violent 
action (Faulkner & Sayre, 1997, p. 24).  In Collins’ (1987) opinion, while Army SF and 
Navy SEALs prioritize more actions such as raids, ambushes, sabotage, and subversion, 
Delta Force and SEAL Team 6 focus more on hostage rescues. 
Regardless of the forms adopted, the historical record shows that DA is 
invariably a complex task that does not tolerate poor standards in planning or execution.  
Developing the circumstances surrounding the raid on Son Tay in November, 1970, 
Vandenbroucke (1993) held that: 
...the U.S. military had not conducted a successful POW rescue since the 
Civil War.  The experience in Southeast Asia had been particularly bleak.  
Between 1966 and 1970, U.S. forces had mounted forty-five raids in 
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Cambodia, Laos, and South Vietnam to rescue American POWs, and had 
freed one. (p. 63) 
 
Ten years after, in April 1980, another high-profile failed attempt to 
rescue American hostages in Iran (Operation Eagle Claw) struck a blow to the U.S.’s 
prestige.  However, the Desert One disaster initiated a SOF reform process that 
culminated in the creation of USSOCOM after a seven-year fight against military and 
political conventionalism (“History”, 2002, pp. 3-6). 
e. Unconventional Warfare 
 Understanding UW requires first defining its opposite concept – 
conventional war.  Adams (1998) views conventional war as: 
…war fought by formally constituted armed forces of a state with the 
immediate purpose of bringing about the direct physical destruction or 
incapacitation of the formally constituted armed forces of some other 
state. (p. 20) 
 
 Citing Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, El Salvador and Nicaragua, the same 
author points out that UW covers a variety of ill-defined and smaller-scale conflicts that 
are not usually waged by the professional armed forces of a state, do not seek to seize and 
hold terrain, and sometimes they are not even conducted for a specific reason (p. 1). 
According to Collins (1993), anticommunism and containment inspired 
most, if not all, U.S. UW during the Cold War.  The task displays both political and 
military characteristics and represents the traditional Army SF mission (p. 24).  By 
conducting UW, SOF operators seek to weaken an established government or occupying 
force, while increasing the control of local insurgent movements already in existence. 
UW involves predominantly long duration and low visibility offensive 
operations alongside indigenous or surrogate forces.  Focusing more on human terrain, 
UW soldiers are familiar with local customs, usually proficient in local languages, and 
help organize, advise, and train indigenous guerrillas. 
Because UW is conducted in the midst of the population and struggles for 
people’s minds, the contributions provided by the CA and PSYOP elements become 
critical.  Indeed, the synergy established among the Army Special Forces, CA, and 
PSYOP units offers USSOCOM unique capability for conducting UW (Adams, 1998, p. 
22). 
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 After waging three notable UW operations during WWII (in the 
Philippines, Burma, and France), the U.S. had seen none on a comparable scale until 
2001.  But in the autumn of 2001 in Afghanistan, UW returned as a task with a dozen 
Army SF operational detachments alpha (ODA) from the 5th SF Group (Task Force 
Dagger).  Those 12-man ODAs had to link up with various local war lords, communicate 
with them, gain their trust, pay them, coordinate airdrops, correlate their movements 
towards Taliban-occupied villages and towns, alleviate the potential for inter-tribe 
conflicts, and eventually call in air strikes. 
 Very pleased with the Special Forces’ performance in Afghanistan, for FY 
2004 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld awarded Army Special Forces Command a 
20 percent increase in funding, an eight percent increase in personnel, and vehemently 
requested the use of SF elements in the campaign against Saddam Hussein (Moore, 2003, 
p. 418). 
f. Information Operations 
 IO and Information Warfare (IW) are two relatively new concepts that 
cover the same forms of warfare.  We will address here only the forms that are most 
relevant to today’s U.S. SOF:  
1. command-and-control warfare, involving antihead offensive actions 
(commanders and command centers are targeted), and antineck operations 
(critical communications systems are cut) 
2. intelligence-based warfare that occurs notably during targeting and battle damage 
assessment when intelligence is used as a direct input for the operations and thus 
results directly in the application of fire to objective 
3. psychological warfare in which information is used to influence the minds of 
friends, neutrals, and opponents; that is, conducting psychological operations 
(Libicki, 1995, p. x). 
 IO missions could demand that SOF elements be able to: locate and attack 
enemy command, control, communications, computer, and intelligence (C4I) nodes; 
provide boots on the ground in denied territory, collect information, and call in air strikes 
against identified high value targets; or plan and execute tailored psychological 
operations campaigns. 
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From this perspective, one could make a case that occasionally DA and 
SR achieve IO gains, while PSYOP clearly represents a subset of IO. 
g. Psychological Operations 
 PSYOP are planned operations aimed at influencing the perceptions, 
attitudes, and, ultimately, the actions of individuals, groups, organizations, and foreign 
governments.  In order to influence these targets, PSYOP capitalizes on subtle themes, 
proper means of dissemination (leaflets printed in correct dialects, or air platforms for 
loudspeakers), and extensive knowledge of local predispositions.  The active duty and 
reserve PSYOP units belong to the U.S. Army and the Air Force elements subordinated 
to USSOCOM, and support mostly conventional forces operations. 
Adams (1998) points out that, although the Green Berets became 
organizationally allied with PSYOP and CA under the USASOC, and thus combined all 
the skills necessary to conduct UW, for many years the SF sought to end this association 
because these units “were thought to detract from the commando image desired by many 
SF troopers and leaders.” (p. 12) 
 These associations with the conventional army notwithstanding, PSYOP 
and special operations share a common history dating back more than half a century.  
According to Collins (1993), in 1952 at Fort Bragg, an imposed and artificial fusion 
occurred between the first Special Forces Group and a newly-formed Psychological 
Warfare Center.  The fusion between the two organizations took place in order to “soften 
resistance by Army, Air Force and CIA officials who then opposed all efforts to create 
military SOF formations” (p. 27). 
As it stands today, two apparent options are opened to the U.S. Congress 
(DoD Directive 5100.1): (1) since PSYOP normally supports conventional operations, the 
Congress could consider shifting PSYOP units to Army control; or (2) keep the already 
existing relationship, partly because, like Rangers, PSYOP elements might atrophy once 
under the Army’s jurisdiction (p. 27). 
However, Collins seems to overlook that the fusion between Army SF and 
PSYOP had precedents in the establishment of the Office of Coordinator of Information 
(OCI) in 1941 and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in 1942 – two organizations 
headed by William Donovan for whom psychological operations encompassed both overt 
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and secret intelligence operations, persuasion, sabotage, subversion, partisan support, and 
guerrilla activities – called special operations (Adams, 1998, pp. 34-35). 
Moreover, in 1951 General McClure, who shared Donovan’s view on 
PSYOPS, organized a Special Operations Division within the Office of the Chief of 
Psychological Warfare (OCPW).  He recruited an OSS veteran, Colonel Aaron Bank, as 
operations officer.  Under Colonel Bank’s influence, the name was changed from Special 
Operations Division to Special Forces Division.  Finally, in 1952 Col. Bank became the 
first commander of the newly authorized 10th Special Forces Group – the first formal 
Army peacetime unit ever assigned with special operations (p.55). 
In conclusion, one could make a case that Army Special Forces are born 
also from Donovan and McClure’s broad vision on psychological operations, and that the 
alliance between SF and PSYOP units was not as artificial as Collins stated.  Since the 
Army SF’s core mission is UW, Adams (1998) envisages the creation of an 
Unconventional Operations Force that would increase the collaboration among ARSF, 
PSYOP and CA assets and disentangle the mix of SOF missions (p. 302). 
h. Foreign Internal Defense 
 Usually part of a broader and long duration interagency effort, FID is 
designed to assist a foreign government in protecting itself from threats ranging from 
internal insurgencies to external and transnational hostiles.  Since this task represents the 
strategically defensive counterpart of UW, the Army SF has embraced FID since the late 
1950s (p. 24).  The SF FID activities may range from training and advising military and 
paramilitary forces, and assisting civilian agencies, to conducting unilateral U.S. 
operations (Harned, 1988, p. 6). 
 As Faulkner & Sayre (1997) pointed out, in order to conduct successful 
FID activities, the following main capabilities are required: instructional, tactical, 
medical and negotiation skills; foreign language proficiency; area orientation; 
intercultural communications; basic PSYOP and CA skills; rudimentary construction and 
engineering skills; and familiarity with a wide variety of weapons, communications, and 
demolitions equipment (p. 26). 
 Although he acknowledged that some UW and FID skills are 
interchangeable, Collins (1993) envisaged the possibility of USSOCOM devoting full 
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attention to FID, which would in turn require Army SF to emphasize some aspects not 
necessarily linked to UW, which is their primary mission today (p. 26).  That being said, 
FID and UW have more similarities than differences, and training for one necessarily will 
improve the skills required for the other. 
i. Civil Affairs Operations (CAO) 
 CAO facilitate civil-military cooperation by providing specialized support 
at national and local levels during all the phases of a crisis.  CA specialists’ main task is 
to support mission requirements concerning minimizing civilian population interference 
with U.S. military operations, lessening the adverse impact of military actions on 
civilians, and establishing and conducting provisional military government or civil 
administration (“SOF Posture”, 2003, p. 37). 
 The bulk of CA missions support conventional commanders, and out of 
the 25 CA battalions functioning under the US Army Special Operations Command, only 
one is active duty (p. 14).  Collins (1993) acknowledged that “even more than PSYOP, 
the merger of Civil Affairs with special operations was a marriage of administrative 
convenience” (p. 27).  Without questioning the importance of independent CA support to 
all military commanders, we conclude that, for maximizing CA contribution to SOF, 
during UW and FID actions, CA should be employed in cooperation with PSYOP. 
2. SOF Collateral Activities 
In addition to these nine principal tasks, Special Operations Forces Reference 
Manual (1998) identified seven SOF collateral activities that, in contrast to the relatively 
stable core tasks previously addressed, may shift more readily according to the challenges 
imposed by the international security environment.  In the following paragraphs we 
provide details about each of the seven. 
Moreover, since the Romanian SO Doctrine lists AT (implied from CBT) and 
Strategic Objectives Security as SF collateral missions, we briefly discuss them as well. 
a. Coalition Support 
 Coalition Support activities aim at helping integrate units into 
multinational coalition military operations.  During Operation Desert Shield and Desert 
Storm, operators of the 5th SF Group advised Arab units of the Islamic coalition (Egypt, 
Syria, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Oman, the UAE and others), assessed their capabilities, 
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provided ground-air communication and coordinating instructions for air support, 
contributed to their operational planning, raised individual foreign soldiers’ fighting 
skills, and developed control measures and coordination among different neighboring 
units.  Within the Kuwaiti brigades, for instance, the Army SF operators’ integration 
efforts were felt at every level of the chain of command. 
 The Commander of the 1st Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group Lt. Col. 
Brownlee (1993) considered the support to the coalition, which the SF units provided, a 
logical extension of their FID capabilities.  In addition to language skills, interpersonal 
and negotiation capabilities, the ODAs needed to be at least as mobile as the assisted 
units, be able to replicate the allies’ communication assets, and be competent in armor 
and mechanized battalion level tactics, indirect fire, air defense and 
countermobility/mobility (pp. 43-44). 
 Acknowledging that “there’s a tremendous time and money requirement to 
make every operational detachment competent in all those skills” (p. 43), Brownlee 
emphasized that previous joint readiness exercises with countries from the 5th Group’s 
Area of Operations (AO) helped his unit to accomplish the task.  Finally, asked how well-
suited were GPF, such as the conventional Army and the Marine Corps, to conduct 
coalition support activities, Brownlee held that those forces’ task was to be able to fight 
in a combined fashion and not to train foreign troops to operate in a coalition setting (p. 
43). 
b. Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) 
 CSAR missions usually represent joint high-risk operations aimed at the 
recovery of distressed personnel during wartime or contingency operations.  By joint 
doctrine, CSAR used to be a service responsibility.  According to the US SOF Posture 
Statement (1998),  
SOF are equipped and manned to perform CSAR in support of 
SOF missions only.  SOF performs CSAR in support of 
conventional forces on a case-by-case basis not to interfere with 
the readiness or operations of core SOF missions. (p. 4) 
 
The greater the risk associated with one recovery operation, the more time 
SOF elements needed for planning and preparation.  Moreover, since they were a 
strategic level tool, planners had to carefully decide where and when to employ SOF 
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capabilities.  Indeed, the operational significance of CSAR operations could have been 
doubtful, or, on the contrary, rescue successes could have generated strategic results in 
terms of psychological impact on the public support of military campaigns. 
 During the Gulf War, for example, Army and Air Force SOF operators 
were tasked to execute CSAR missions because the Air Force assets were incapable of 
conducting long range infiltrations into denied territory.  While that assignment might 
have been justifiable so long as the ongoing SOF operations and readiness were not being 
affected, the use of eight ODAs from the 5th and 10th SF Groups as ground security 
elements demonstrated poor tasking.  Any infantry squad or fire team could have served 
as a standard security force for CSAR contingencies; therefore, the mission was not 
suitable for the Green Berets (Tovo, 1996, p. 7). 
 Joint Pub 3-50.2, Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue noted two 
situations when SOF teams could have been rightly directed to execute rescue tasks: (1) 
when the terrain, weather, or enemy air defense prohibited dedicated conventional CSAR 
elements to intervene, and (2) when an Army SF detachment was already present in the 
vicinity of distressed personnel (p. 7). 
The dangers of SOF misuse for CSAR missions recently have been 
eliminated with the development of Program Action Directive (PAD) that directs the 
transfer of select CSAR assets (HC-130, HH-60s, and Combat Rescue 
Officers/pararescuemen) from Air Combat Command (ACC) to Air Force Special 
Operations Command (AFSOC). 
Therefore, today USSOCOM has administrative control (ADCON) of 
these CSAR dedicated assets along with the associated force structure, manpower, and 
units, and it thus has become the only establishment formally responsible for all CSAR 
activities (“CSAR Transfer PAD”, 2003, pp. i-ii). 
c. Counterdrug Activities 
 CD operations are carried out by area-oriented SOF teams who provide 
specific training to counternarcotics forces of the host nation in order to detect, monitor, 
and counter the production and trafficking of illegal drugs.  During fiscal year 1997, for 
example, SOF teams completed more than 190 missions of this type, most of them 
against drug cartels, criminals, and insurgents in Latin America (Collins, 2000, p. 5).  
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Although they are forbidden by law to participate in counterinsurgency actions, U.S. SOF 
personnel are allowed to teach intelligence-collection, patrolling, infantry tactics, and 
counterterrorism.  Of particular note, is the involvement of the American counterterrorist 
unit - the Delta Force - as trainers in the hunt for Pablo Escobar from 1989 to 1993, in 
Columbia (Bowden, 2002, p. 65). 
 However, not all counterdrug missions are hazardous.  Developing the 
threat awareness among civil and military leaders of the host nations, conducting classes 
for school children, and teaching aircraft maintenance skills are all activities that SOF 
Reserve and National Guard elements conduct in order to support the fight against 
narcotraffickers and narcoterrorists (Collins, 2000, pp. 5-6). 
d. Countermine Activities  
 CM activities refer to training missions offered to host nation forces in the 
location and safe disposal of mines, booby-traps, and other destructive devices.  Such 
activities usually belong to a broader HA mission.  Of note would be the involvement of 
Army SF in humanitarian demining in Cambodia, Namibia, Mozambique, Ethiopia, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, or Costa Rica (“SOF Posture Statement”, 1998, p. 9). 
 In order to conduct effective demining activities, SOF specialists need 
language skills and organic engineering and demolitions capabilities.  PSYOP and CA 
elements can help as well, by assisting the local governments in developing and 
conducting public education programs designed to increase public awareness of the 
problem (Faulkner & Sayre, 1997, p. 27). 
Finally, one could make a strong case that the last two collateral activities 
that we have addressed above – CD and CM – are subsets of FID (Boyatt, 1994, p. 13). 
e. Humanitarian Assistance 
 Amended by the Congress in 1986, Title 10, Section 167, United States 
Code lists HA as one of the ten tasks equivalent to statutory roles and missions for special 
operations.  But since DoD Directive 5100.1 did not specify any function for 
USSOCOM, SOF doctrine downgraded HA from a statutory imperative to a collateral 
activity (Collins, 1993, p. 22). 
 These inconsistent instructions notwithstanding, when SOF personnel 
conduct HA, they are employed to support nonmilitary objectives that may include: 
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disaster relief, support to and resettlement of displaced civilians, water, sanitation, 
expedient communications, rudimentary construction assistance, or medical, veterinary, 
and dental care.  Army SF, CA, and PSYOP forces are well suited to accomplish such 
activities (Faulkner & Sayre, 1997, p. 27).  For example, U.S. SOF assets helped reduce 
the results of Hurricane Mitch, and assisted in the evacuation of over 900 Hondurans 
(“SOF Posture”, 2000, p. 19). 
 Collins (1993) holds that this type of HA activities is a subset of civil-
military operations, which, in turn, support FID; therefore, Title 10 could discard HA as a 
specific special operations activity (p. 25). 
f. Security Assistance  
 Adams (1998) considered security assistance activities as representing a 
group of programs authorized by law, during which, the U.S. provides defense articles, 
military training, and other defense-related services in support of the country’s political 
objectives.  For SOF operators this task primarily consists of providing mobile training 
teams (MTT), and other forms of training assistance (p. xxiv). 
 Similar to the transition from FID to coalition support activities, SOF 
teams may be required to shift from a security assistance posture to the combat role of 
coalition support in case a conflict breaks out.  One could conclude that Coalition 
Support and Security Assistance require a great number of interchangeable skills, and 
could therefore belong to one single broader mission for Army SF – FID. 
g. Special Activities 
 This controversial task involves clandestine activities (concealment of the 
operation) or covert actions3 (concealment of the sponsor’s identity) executed abroad in 
support of national foreign policy.  Conducting special activities, SOF elements may act 
independently and perform any of their principal missions, or in a supporting role for 
agencies such as the CIA or the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) that may by in 
charge. 
 Given the complexities of the task, special activities (black arts or 
paramilitary operations) are highly compartmented and centrally managed and controlled.  
In addition, the conduct of special activities is limited by Executive Order 12333 of 
                                                 
3 Normally, covert actions are executed by the CIA, and not by the DoD. 
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December 4, 1981 (outlawing assassination), and by the requirements of a Presidential 
finding and congressional oversight (Collins, 2000, p. 4). 
h. Antiterrorism 
 One of the most comprehensive definitions available is that offered by 
Adams (1998). In his view, AT consists of:  
defensive measures, including intelligence and counterintelligence 
support, to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist 
acts, to include limited response and containment by local military forces.  
It includes that part of security concerned with physical measures designed 
to safeguard personnel; to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, 
installation, material, and documents; and to safeguard them against 
espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft.  It also includes personal 
protective services that consist primarily of executive protection and 
training efforts in terrorist threat awareness. (p. xv) 
 
 The Romanian SO Doctrine (2003) looks at AT and CT as very closely 
linked missions, and underscores that, when secret services or other security agencies 
express the need for help in AT-related issues, SF will assist them by providing training 
and advice in order to reduce the existing vulnerabilities to terrorist attacks (p. 16). 
Collins (1993) considers AT and CT two very distinct missions that are at 
the same time flip sides of the same coin.  He proposes an amendment to Title 10 and 
DoD Directive 5100.1 that would allow elite counterterrorist members of the secret JSOC 
to educate and train State Department and FBI antiterrorist elements.  An alternative 
would be the assignment of AT to USSOCOM as a principal mission (p. 25). 
i. Strategic Objectives Security 
 As the last collateral mission of ROSF, SOS will be executed only when 
the conventional forces destined to guard and secure these objectives are no longer 
capable of combat (p. 19).  Although the task is doctrinally planned to be executed by SF 
in extreme situations and in defense of strategic level objectives, it seems difficult to 
imagine a scenario in which SF elements would bring more fire power and men than 
additional conventional elements. 
The contingencies surrounding this conventional last task should be 
developed in more than one paragraph, since, according to the law, security for strategic 
assets is Romanian gendarmes’ responsibility (“Lege privind paza obiectivelor”, 2003, 
pp. 3-4). 
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 Illustrating the SOF’ dual nature addressed earlier, SOF tasks could be 
separated in two main categories: one unconventional that is centered on UW and FID, 
and encompasses PSYOP, CAO, HA, Coalition Support, Security Assistance, CD and 
CM activities; and a second, maybe less unconventional, but highly specialized and 
demanding, that comprises CT, CP of WMD, DA, SR, CSAR, and Special Activities.  IO 
is present in both categories.  But, despite the entanglements that one could observe in the 
current mix of U.S. SOF tasks (of which the Romanian SOF leaders should be aware); 
there is a real correlation between all the U.S. SOF missions and defense-related strategic 
level documents.  
D. SOF SUPPORT TO STRATEGIC GOALS 
In developing CT and the CP of WMD, we have seen how simple it is to link U.S. 
SOF core tasks to their respective national strategies.  Half a century ago, the Truman 
Doctrine held that the U.S., in order to protect its own national security interests, “must 
support free peoples who are resisting any attempted subjugation by armed minorities or 
by outside pressures.” (Adams, 1998, p. 45) 
That doctrine supported the engagement of assets in security assistance missions 
in Greece and Turkey, and it established a prototype for subsequent SOF 
counterinsurgency interventions.  Today, in the current National Military Strategy (NMS) 
of the U.S., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Richard Myers (2004) stated: 
The NMS serves to focus the Armed Forces on maintaining US leadership 
in a global community that is challenged on many fronts – from 
countering the threat of global terrorism to fostering emerging 
democracies.  In this environment, US presence and commitment to 
partners are essential.  Our Armed Forces, operating at home and abroad, 
in peace and war, will continue to serve as a constant, visible reminder of 
US resolve to protect common interests.  Our dedication to security and 
stability ensures that the Unites States is viewed as an indispensable 
partner, encouraging other nations to join us in helping make the world not 
just safer, but better. (p. iii) 
 
The manner in which SOF support the 2004 National Defense Strategy and the 
ambitious goals stated in National Military Strategy (NMS) is acknowledged in the U.S. 
SOF Posture Statement.  As shown in Table 2, the SOF Posture (2003) lists the four goals 
of the US defense policy, identifies the tasks that support these goals, and finally details 
the type of support that USSOCOM provides (pp. 27-28). 
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The only task that seems difficult to be associated with a specific defense policy 
goal would be CSAR, but personnel recovery operations could be linked to Department 
of Defense Directive 2310.2 that affirms the DOD policy to preserve the well-being of 
US personnel who may have to evade , are detained, captured, missing or isolated 
(Patrick & Patterson, 2004, p. 28). 
 




SOF tasks that implement 
the policy 




Security Assistance; FID; 
CM; PSYOP; Activities; HA; 
CD Activities; CAO 
Security cooperation plans; common 




Maintain credible capabilities; 
PSYOP; Maximize readiness 





CT; CP of WMD; Signal US 
resolve; PSYOP 





Coalition Support; PSYOP ; 
UW; IO; SR; SA; DA 
SOF as a valuable source of 
intelligence and a force multiplier 
for GPF capabilities 
 
In the final analysis, all the doctrinal tasks with which the U.S. SOF community 
could be tasked, implement higher policy goals, thus helping to gain acceptability and 
support within military and political circles. 
E. DEVELOPING THE METHOD FOR ROSF RE-TASKING 
How can one ensure coherence between the Romanian SF tasks and the strategic 
imperatives of the country?  How can one emulate USSOCOM’s example and make sure 
that all the sixteen missions stated in the Romanian SO doctrine support the country’s 
strategic and/or defense policy goals? 
As Cook (1994) defined it, doctrine should be “composed of the fundamental 
principles by which military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of 
national objectives.” (p. 38) Moreover, former Secretary of the Army John Marsh Jr. 
held: 
The development of a doctrine is the cornerstone upon which a special 
operations capability can be erected … our failure … to develop doctrine 
has prevented special operations in the Army from gaining permanence 
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and acceptability within the ranks of the military. (As cited Adams, 1998, 
p. 13) 
 
The following paragraphs develop the framework that eventually proposes 
suggestions for the development of a doctrine that would link ROSF’s tasks with the 
country’s National Security Strategy via subordinated defense policy documents (Cook, 
1996, p. 37). 
In his article Perspectives on Emerging SOF Roles and Missions, Christopher 
Lamb (1995) specifies that, when assessing new roles and missions for SOF, three key 
variables must be taken into account: 
1. The nature of the threat and the security environment we anticipate in the 
future.  We must prepare to meet the missions that will actually be 
required of our armed forces. 
2. The national security strategy that the United States is adopting to deal 
with the post-Cold War security environment.  Different strategies may 
require different missions and capabilities. 
3. The nature of the forces themselves.  If SOF are asked to conduct missions 
contrary to their current nature, they will eventually evolve into different 
types of forces.  The risk inherent in such change is that SOF will 
duplicate the capabilities of conventional forces and will be unable to 
effectively conduct traditional special-operations missions. (pp. 2-3) 
 
Combining Lamb and Cook’s views and applying Lamb’s suggestions to the 
ROSF case, we conclude that proposing new tasks for the Romanian SF, and implicitly a 
new doctrine, is an endeavor that should seriously consider the following four questions: 
1. Given that Romania is a committed NATO ally and an aspiring EU member, what 
are the main features of the country’s security environment in terms of threats and 
subsequent requirements for the military? 
2. In light of the guidance provided by Romanian national security documents, what 
are the major military tasks of the Romanian Armed Forces to support the policy 
goals of the country? 
3. Once these tasks are determined, which can be accomplished by the Romanian 
General-Purpose Forces (GPF) or other security services? 
4. Of the tasks that cannot be addressed by GPF or other domestic organizations, 
which are appropriate SF tasks? 
26 
Answering these four questions is equivalent to applying Christopher Lamb’s 
model.  This application will eventually lead to the identification of appropriate 
Romanian SF tasks that will promote national strategic goals, and will be adapted to the 
Romania’s security environment within the North Atlantic Alliance. 
F. SUMMARY 
This chapter has outlined the majority of the elements necessary to the future 
understanding of the ROSF re-tasking and re-structuring.  The Romanian SO doctrine is 
extensively inspired by the U.S. SOF institutionalized experiences.  Of the 16 ROSF 
principal and collateral missions, 15 of them are similar to the U.S. SOF core tasks and 
collateral activities. 
Despite the complexity that characterizes USSOCOM’s mix of missions, and 
although some role assignments within the American SOF community might still be 
debatable, all the tasks assigned to USSOCOM support national-level policy goals.  In an 
attempt to emulate this correlation between tasks and strategy, we have adopted the 
method developed by Christopher Lamb.  He specifies that, when tasking SOF, one must 
take into consideration the nature of the security environment, the country’s national 
security documents, and the nature of the forces themselves. 
With the subsequent application of Lamb’s method, we intend to provide ROSF 
tasks that are suitable for SOF, can not be executed by GPF or other security agencies, 











III. LAMB’S MODEL APPLIED: TASKS FOR ROSF 
The previous chapter offered details about each ROSF doctrinal task without 
debating the appropriateness of the Romanian SO Doctrine mission choices.  At this 
point, however, armed with insights from the U.S. SOF experience, and with the model 
developed by Christopher Lamb, we are ready to put the doctrine to the test. 
Out of the sixteen most likely ROSF mission-assignments, how many will prove 
to be appropriate once the model is applied?  Will the model demonstrate the necessity 
for ROSF to encompass new tasks?  A step by step approach in the application of Lamb’s 
method eventually reveals that only five strategic tasks cannot be successfully addressed 
by the Romanian GPF or other security organizations and thus are appropriate for ROSF. 
Four of these tasks are rightly anticipated by the SO Doctrine - CBT, CP of WMD, SR, 
and DA; one follows from the framework we are applying - VIP security in troubled 
areas. 
A look at Romania’s allies in NATO and the EU introduces the reader to the 
Euro-Atlantic and Romanian security environments.  Then, an analysis of Romania’s 
defense policy documents helps determine the RAF’s strategic tasks, and from that point, 
appropriate principal and collateral missions for the Romanian SF. 
A. THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE 
Today, in light of the Alliance’s 1999 Washington Summit and subsequent recent 
events, it seems accurate to describe NATO as a complex and unique political and 
military regional organization, with no supra-national authority.  It forms an Alliance of 
26 sovereign states whose fundamental purpose is the use of collective political and 
military means “to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members”, and to 
contribute to the peace and stability of the wider Euro-Atlantic area (“Reader’s Guide”, 
1999, p. 48). 
After ten years of collaboration with the Alliance, within the Partnership for 
Peace (PfP)4, on March 29, 2004 Romania formally became a member of NATO. That 
day, Romania – a country that was in the middle of a complex military transformation 
                                                 
4 Romania was the first country to have joined the PfP 
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process – integrated into an Alliance that was also transforming in order to meet the new 
security threats. 
Attempting to answer the first question of Lamb’s method and develop Romania’s 
security environment, the following paragraphs concisely address these new threats and 
the requirements that NATO demands from its military components, including SF units.  
In doing so, we start from the assumption that, ideally, as soon as a state X voluntarily 
integrates into a collective security alliance A, the characteristics of both A and X’s 
external security environments tend to overlap, and the threats identified by the alliance 
A become challenges that must be dealt with by state X. 
Subsequently, developing the nature of the new threats perceived by the North 
Atlantic Alliance is similar with defining the main aspects of Romania’s security 
environment.  As we observe later in Romania’s case, this assumption is indeed justified 
since the country’s strategic level documents took the Allied security prescriptions very 
seriously. 
1. New Threats 
On October 3, 2002, at the Alliance’s Conference “NATO: A Vision for 2012”, in 
his speech “Prague 2002: Challenge and Change for NATO”, former NATO Secretary 
General Lord Robertson (2002) tried to predict the challenges that the international 
community was likely to face in the years ahead including: 
1. Increased instability in Caucasus, Central Asia, Northern Africa, and the Middle 
East 
2. More spillover effects into the local trouble areas, Europe, and North America; 
that is, migration, asylum seekers, people smuggling, violence, and drugs 
3. More terrorism resulting in the murder of innocent people 
4. More failed states that will become potential safe heavens for terrorists 
5. More proliferation that will lead to the spread of WMD into the hands of non-state 
actors who are not always deterrable 
Less than two months later, on November 21, 2002, the Heads of State and 
Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Prague issued a 
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declaration that developed in technical terms the aspects previously stated by the 
Secretary General Robertson.  Article 3 of the declaration read: 
Recalling the tragic events of 11 September 2001 and our subsequent 
decision to invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, we have approved 
a comprehensive package of measures, based on NATO’s Strategic 
Concept, to strengthen our ability to meet the challenges to the security of 
our forces, populations, and territory, from wherever they may come.  
Today’s decisions will provide for balanced and effective capabilities 
within the Alliance so that NATO can better carry out the full range of its 
missions and respond collectively to those challenges, including the threat 
posed by terrorism and by the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction and their means of delivery. (Prague Summit Declaration, 
2002) 
In short, with the Prague Summit, the debate about the Alliance’s role exclusively 
within the Euro-Atlantic region has ended.  The strategic concepts developed during the 
Washington Summit in 1999 have been extrapolated, and today’s NATO requires from 
its military the capability of addressing the “new threats”, from rogue states to terrorism 
using WMD, anywhere. 
2. New Requirements 
Holding that geography will no longer act as a shield, during the same speech 
Lord Robertson proposed a set of improvements that would facilitate the Alliance’s 
efforts to cope with the threats, and prevent future tragedies.  Only the suggestions that 
are relevant to the argument of our project are addressed herein: tailored military 
capabilities, such as wide-bodied aircraft capable of transporting military units that are 
slimmer, tougher, faster, and stay in the field longer; consultation between the Allies; a 
broader security cooperation that extends beyond Europe to Central Asia, and the 
Mediterranean; and institutional cooperation between actors such as the UN, NATO, 
OSCE, EU, and NGOs.  Additionally, the Allied leaders decided on a range of key issues 
including: 
1. The creation of an agile, flexible, deployable (anywhere within 5 to 30 days), 
combined, and joint NATO Response Force (NRF), which would be able to 
sustain itself for 30 days 
2. The transformation of NATO’s command design with a view to providing 
smaller, more effective, efficient, and deployable command structures 
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3. The strengthening of the Alliance’s capabilities for defense against terrorism, 
NBC, and cyber attacks 
4. The approval of the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC), through which 
individual member states made “firm and specific political commitments to 
improve their capabilities” in various areas ranging from air-to air refueling to 
intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition (“NATO's contribution”, 2004). 
One of the main objectives behind the PCC was to encourage both old and new 
allies to increase and direct their defense spending towards the creation of credible 
capabilities in areas where serious shortfalls had been recorded: mobility and 
deployability, sustainability, effective engagement, interoperable communications, 
information superiority, and CBRN defense (“Fact Sheet: NATO”, 2002). 
Another main product of the NATO Prague summit was the NRF.  The force was 
officially created on October 15, 2003, directed to achieve its Initial Operational 
Capability by the end of 2004, and reach its Full Operational Capability by fall 2006 
(“NATO Response Force Inauguration”, 2003). 
In U.S. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld’s opinion, expressed during the September 
2002 meeting of NATO Defense Ministers, the NRF was to become “an intellectual 
equivalent of a raid” (Mariano & Wilson, 2003).  In technical terms, the NRF is planned 
to provide “a coherent, high readiness, joint, multinational force package, technologically 
advanced, flexible, deployable, interoperable, and sustainable.” (“The NATO Response 
Force”, 2004) 
As far as the force’s tasks, the NRF will be tailored for specific missions and will 
perform some of them independently, or in conjunction with other forces.  So far, there 
are three employment scenarios for the NRF: 
1. Acting independently within this expeditionary framework, in a crisis response 
scenario, the NRF is expected to have the flexibility and the capabilities to: 
evacuate non-combatants; support consequence management (including CBNR 
incidents); provide support in humanitarian crises; manage crisis response 
operations (including peacekeeping); conduct embargo operations; execute CT 
missions 
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2. Deployed in support of a larger force, the NRF will facilitate its arrival acting as 
an initial entry element - “First force in, first force out”, which constitutes the 
NRF motto 
3. Serving as a demonstrative force package, the NRF will support diplomatic efforts 
by deterring potential opponents (“NATO Response Force 3”, 2004). 
In terms of the Alliance’s approach towards terrorism, NATO’s Military Concept 
for Defense against Terrorism (2003) was approved by the North Atlantic Council and 
endorsed by Heads of State and Government at the Prague Summit.  The document 
stipulated that there were four roles that NATO military forces could play for defense 
against terrorism: AT, consequence management, CT, and military cooperation.  
Implementing the concept necessitated additional requirements in a number of fields such 
as specialized intelligence, more specialized AT forces, deployable CT forces that were at 
a high state of readiness, and an effective and timely decision-making process. 
3. Role for SF5 
Integral elements of the future 21,000-strong NRF are already provided by ‘niche’ 
capabilities including Special Forces and small CBNR detection teams.  The need for 
niche forces comes is convenient for smaller allies who can use their already existing 
expertise and find the right balance between specialization, pooling, and duplication of 
capabilities (“NATO Response Force”, 2004). 
During a press conference in Romania, General Jones (2004) (Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe) declared: 
the NRF is by concept expeditionary in nature.  It’s the first time in NATO 
that we’ve fused air-land-sea and special operations under one command.  
It forces us to look at some of our other shortfalls that we didn’t fully 
appreciate perhaps in the twentieth century when the Alliance was more 
static and more linear in term of its missions. 
In all three abovementioned employment scenarios for NRF, one could identify 
possible tasks for SF units.  But the way units are used during exercises says more about 
the concept of employment than logical deductions.  Indeed, the first two exercises 
mounted by the NRF made extensive use of SF from contributing NATO nations.  In the                                                  
5 According to the sources we have used, in NATO vocabulary SOF is rarely used, the preferred term 
being SF. 
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first NRF exercise – a mock crisis response operation executed on November 20, 2003, in 
Turkey – SF soldiers from the host-country rescued UN staff and civilians that were 
taken prisoners by terrorists (“Response Force demonstrate capability”, 2003). 
On October 13, 2004, SF units from Greece, Italy, Spain, and Turkey participated 
in the second NRF exercise held in Italy (“NRF demonstrates initial operational 
capability”, 2004).  They conducted helicopter insertions behind enemy lines, amphibious 
assaults, and secured key terrain (“Photos of Exercise Destined Glory”, 2004). 
In light of the NATO’s rhetoric and analyzing the way the NRF employed SF 
elements during exercises, we can discern already stated and implied core tasks for SF 
elements belonging to the Alliance: 
1. CT – a role that is both overwhelmingly emphasized in official documents, and 
already played during NRF exercise in Turkey 
2. DA – present during both NRF exercises, a task common to all Allied SF-type 
units 
3. SR – another universally accepted SF task, which could complement the 
collection capabilities of the deployed NRF, and augment intelligence collection 
capabilities required by the NATO’s Military Concept for Defense against 
Terrorism. 
4. CP of WMD – since it is generally accepted that WMD in terrorist hands is the 
worst case scenario, it is not surprising that SF are directed to conduct SR and DA 
missions to help in countering that threat. 
B. THE EUROPEAN UNION 
Considerations regarding the necessity to build European rapid reaction forces 
(now that almost all the EU members are in NATO as well) are beyond the scope of this 
thesis.  The case today is that the two entities are able to justify their respective raison 
d’être, and that Romania aspires to become a committed member in both organizations 
(not only in NATO).  As the Romanian Prime Minister stated, “Euro-Atlantic integration 
is and will continue to be the cornerstone of our present and future stability.” (Nastase, 
2002, p. 8) 
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As it was previously the case with the Alliance, we assume that by discussing the 
EU’s strategic environment one develops an understanding of Romania’s security issues.  
Although not a member state yet, Romania was one of the five non-EU countries who 
already envisaged contributions to the European rapid reaction forces (Lindstrom, 2004, 
p. 1).  Moreover, the country’s political, economic, legal, military, and social efforts are 
directed toward joining the EU by 2007, and, as stated in the National Security Strategy 
of Romania (2001), one of the country’s national security policy goals is to intensify the 
negotiations, and to accelerate preparations for the integration into the EU, including the 
involvement in the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) (p. 23). 
The Military Strategy of Romania (2000) also claims that, within the framework 
of NATO, the country supports the development of European Security and Defense 
efforts.  To support these claims, Romania participated in the EU-led operation 
CONCORDIA in Macedonia in 2003. 
1. New Challenges 
Stating that a large-scale aggression against any Member State is today 
improbable, the European Security Strategy (2003) identifies five new key threats: 
terrorism, proliferation of WMD, regional conflicts, state failure, and organized crime 
(pp. 5-6).  In tackling these dynamic threats, the strategy specifies that the first line of 
defense will be often outside the EU borders, and “conflict prevention and threat 
prevention cannot start too early.” (p. 8) 
The EU pursues three strategic objectives that will defend its security, and 
promote its values: addressing the threats, building security in its neighborhood, and 
developing an international order based on effective multilateralism (pp. 8-11).  
However, the European Security Strategy admits that the Member States need to6: 
1. Be more active in the pursuit of the EU strategic objective through the application 
of the full mixture of instruments available for crisis management and conflict 
prevention, and by fostering a strategic culture that encourages “early, rapid, and 
when necessary, robust intervention” (p. 13) 
2. Become more capable by: the establishment of a defense agency; the 
transformation of the military into more flexible, mobile, and versatile forces;                                                  
6 Only the points that are related to our argument are mentioned. 
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increasing the budgets for these forces, and spending the resources more 
effectively; reducing duplication by using pooled and shared assets; developing 
civilian assets necessary for dealing with crisis and post crisis situations; 
improved sharing of intelligence; support for third countries in CBT; or enhanced 
partnership between NATO and the EU (p. 14) 
3. Be more coherent in terms of defense institutions building such as the European 
Security and Defense Policy 
4. Increase the cooperation with partners (p. 15). 
2. Roles for the Military 
In order to cope with the new challenges, European military means will be used as 
part of a full spectrum of political, economic, intelligence, police, judicial, and 
humanitarian instruments (p. 9). 
In support of the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) – the European Union’s second pillar – and within the framework of ESDP, 
almost five years ago in Helsinki, the European Union Member States decided on The 
Headline Goal - a military capability target that planned for the union’s capacity to 
deploy within 60 days a force up to a corps level, by December 2003.  The corps’ 50,000-
60,000 troops were to be voluntarily offered by the Member States, sustainable for one 
year, and employed in support of the full spectrum of the Petersberg tasks that are: 
1. Humanitarian actions 
2. Peacekeeping 
3. Crisis-management, including peacemaking/peace enforcement 
4. Rescue operations 
Later on, following an evaluation of the overall project, the EU leaders identified 
38 considerable shortfalls in terms of national capability commitments (ranging from lack 
of strategic airlift to insufficient medical support).  Addressing those shortfalls, on 
December 2001 the EU Council initiated the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) 
by which 19 panels of national experts were set up and given time until March 1, 2003, to 
deliver solutions.  The EU Military Staff (EUMS) coordinated the panels’ efforts 
(Schmitt, 2004, pp. 1-3). 
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After years of refined analysis and adjustments, the number of shortfalls could 
only be reduced to 15.  In May 2003 via the Declaration on EU Military Capabilities 
(2003), the Ministers of the EU Member States welcomed the results provided by the 
panels, but, at the same time, announced a second phase of the ECAP, that would aim at 
implementing concrete plans and programs. 
Fifteen Project Groups were subsequently set up, each headed by a ‘lead nation’, 
and were expected to offer solutions through: more efficient use of the already existing 
capabilities, new acquisitions, joint procurement, leasing, and role specialization or 
multinationalization, in which one or more EU-members would offer one particular 
capability.  Today, all these elements and the remaining twelve areas in need of 
improvement are part of a new plan – “Headline Goal 2010” – endorsed by the European 
Council in June 2004. 
In terms of the role that the already existing European military establishments 
could play in the fight against terrorism, the EU position became clearer after the 
bombings in Madrid on March 11, 2004.  Following September 11, 2001, the EU officials 
only agreed that the Union should build CT and CP capabilities; therefore, in the absence 
of concrete adjustments, the Petersberg missions stayed unchanged (Archick & Gallis, 
2004, p. 18).  Two weeks after the terrorist attacks in Spain, the EU leaders announced a 
new Declaration on Combating Terrorism (2004) that called for, among other measures, 
the reinforcement of the role of Europol, a maximization of the effectiveness of 
information systems and a development of the ESDP contribution to the fight against 
terrorism.  In other words, European military assets such as SF elements might be 
expected to be assigned a role in the fight, alongside police and intelligence services. 
3. Roles for SF 
Among other capabilities, for crisis management operations, three EU members 
(France, Italy, and Spain) made available Special Forces units as components of the 
European rapid reaction forces (“The Military Balance”, 2002, p. 30).  But the intended 
tasking for these specific units is still unclear since the Europeans have not conducted the 
types of exercises the NRF mounted over the last two years. 
The project group that dealt with Special Operations Forces (the lead nation 
being Portugal) identified three aspects in need of deeper study and improvement: a SOF 
36 
doctrine, general interoperability, and interoperability in terms of communications and 
support for the deployed elements. 
Germany led the project group that was assigned the Combat Search and Rescue 
(CSAR) field.  The group’s conclusion was that although the capabilities for such a 
mission were present at the European level, there was a need for qualitative 
improvements.  Again, the lack of a joint doctrine was felt, along with the necessity to 
prepare and execute realistic exercises.  In addition, the group agreed that the decision 
made by a number of member states to procure new helicopters would increase the 
European CSAR capabilities by 2009. 
The project group led by Belgium focused on Interoperability Issues for 
Evacuation and Humanitarian Operations.  The group acknowledged that, in order to 
accomplish such a demanding task, the Europeans would need interoperable units that 
were at a high level of operational readiness (“European defence”, 2003). 
In conclusion, in order to identify all the shortcomings and reinforce its military 
capabilities, the EU and its Military Staff definitely need more time.  Their main 
objective in the elaboration of the headline goal will continue to be an effective 
performance in crisis management scenarios.  Translated into military terminology, this 
effectiveness is built around capability improvements in the following areas: command 
and control, interoperability, deployability, sustainability, flexibility, mobility, and 
survivability (“Elaboration of the headline goal”, 2000).  As far as CBT, whether the 
Headline Goal will imitate the NRF and include CT into its mission spectrum still 
remains to be determined.  In addition, in light of the new declaration mentioned above, 
one can speculate that in the future European SF may be organized, provided a doctrine, 
and tasked with CT missions outside the EU borders. 
Table 3 summarizes NATO and EU views on their respective security 
environments.  While both entities perceive basically the same challenges and display the 
same views on how modern and effective combined military forces should look, it is 
obvious that the NRF enjoys a clearer and broader spectrum of missions.  The NRF is 
indeed a military instrument that has already proven its initial operational capability, and 
has boldly encompassed new and various missions.  Within the NRF, SF capabilities are 
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being considered a priority for NATO’s defense architecture.  Despite the lack of SF joint 
doctrine, SF elements are relevant, at least in theory, for the European Headline Goal as 
well, the only important difference being that the EU military forces are still in the 
process of formation. 
 


































Sustainability, Efficient C2, Effective 
engagement, Communications, 






Coherence, High readiness, Joint and 






Specialized AT forces 
Deployable CT forces at a high state 
of readiness 












Crisis response ops. 
(peacekeeping) 
Embargo ops.  
CT 


































4) State failure 
5) Organized 
crime 
Headline Goal 2010 
 
C2, Interoperability, Deployability,  
Sustainability, Flexibility, Mobility,  


















That being said, we will notice in the next sections that both organizations 
influence Romania’s security environment and stated military priorities. 
C. FROM STRATEGY TO RAF TASKS 
In Romania, the President of the Republic is required to submit the National 
Security Strategy (NSS) to the Parliament for approval.  This strategy constitutes the key 
national defense planning document and will inspire the creation of the Government’s 
Defense White Paper that, in turn, guides the conception of the Military Strategy of 
Romania (MSR).  While the Parliament approves the NSS and the White Paper, the 
Government endorses the MSR.  The hierarchical and sequential relationship that exists 
among the three key documents implies that the MSR created by the Romanian Ministry 
of National Defense (MoND) implements the views of the administration’s White Paper 
that, in turn, supports the NSS (“Ordonanta privind planificarea apararii”, 2000). 
But due to reasons that are beyond the scope of this study, the strategic level 
documents mentioned above are created in a different succession.  We mention them in 
order of their appearance, together with the key events that shape Romania’s perception 
of its environment: 
1. NATO Washington Summit – April, 1999 
2. The Government White Paper – November, 1999 
3. The Military Strategy – April, 2000 
4. Terrorist attacks against the U.S. – September, 2001 
5. The National Security Strategy – December, 2001 
6. NATO Prague Summit – November, 2002 
7. Romania becomes a NATO member – March, 2004 
8. A renewed Government Defense White Paper – May, 2004 
Although all four documents display the same openness toward Euro-Atlantic 
integration, only the last two are adapted to the post-9/11 security environment.  In 
addition, the new White Paper takes into account Romania’s new status as an Allied 
country.  Consequently, because the MSR tended to focus more on Romania’s defense 
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rather than cultivation of expeditionary capabilities in support of NATO’s new agenda, in 
applying Lamb’s method, we will limit ourselves to the NSS, and the current Defense 
White Paper7. 
1. The National Security Strategy 
In December 2001, the Parliament of Romania approved the new NSS8 which 
broadened the state’s perceptions on the security environment, defined the national 
security interest, identified national risks, and outlined the national policy objectives 
(Zulean, 2004, pp. 3-4).  Of the six proposed in the NSS (2001), at least three of the 
national interests have obvious relevance for defense issues: 
1. Preservation of the integrity, unity, sovereignty and independence of the 
Romanian state 
2. Protection of the security and safety of Romania’s citizens 
3. Achievement of the conditions for the country’s integration into NATO 
and the EU – “Romania must become a component with full obligations 
and rights of the two organizations, the only ones capable of guaranteeing 
its independence and sovereignty.” (National Security Strategy, 2001) 
Moreover, five national security policy objectives are related to defense issues 
and clearly contribute to the accomplishment of the national interests mentioned above: 
1. Preserving the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of 
the Romanian state, under the specific conditions of NATO and EU 
integrations 
2. Protecting the security of the citizens 
3. Optimizing the national defense capability in accordance with NATO 
standards 
                                                 
7 It is with regret that we let aside the MSR, since the document explicitly mentions Special Forces as 
a tool to be used along the enemy’s depth. 
8 Both the NSS and the MSR were developed before Romania’s accession to NATO in 2004.  Today, 
the only objective left for Romania, in terms of joining Euro-Atlantic organizations, is represented by the 
EU integration.  It is expected that, after the presidential elections in November 2004, the new 
administration will adopt a new MSR that will be adapted to Romania’s new status as a full NATO-
member. 
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4. Improving the capacity to participate in international actions aiming at 
combating terrorism and organized crime 
5. Active participation in international cooperation actions aimed at 
combating terrorism and transnational organized crime. 
With regard to challenges, the strategy identified the following main foreign risk 
factors to the national security: crisis at a sub-regional level; ethnic-related tensions; 
proliferation of WMD; development of transnational terrorist organizations; organized 
crime; human trafficking; refugee flows; illegal access to computer systems; or deliberate 
provocation of environmental catastrophes. 
Underscoring that international terrorism became increasingly complex and 
unpredictable, the NSS prescribed that Romania’s internal capabilities for crisis 
management should be better coordinated so that the country would meet the 
requirements in terms of operational and effective participation in the international efforts 
to counter the threat. 
Finally, the NSS offered clear directions for the national security policy.  We will 
mention at this point only those directions that pertain to national defense issues and are 
relevant for our argument: 
1. Achievement of interoperability with NATO forces 
2. Creation and strengthening of the capabilities necessary for fulfilling, in a 
exemplary manner, the commitments made by Romania to take part in operations 
of peace-keeping, rescue, crisis response, combating terrorism, and humanitarian 
assistance at sub-regional and regional levels 
3. Operationalization of the forces assigned to participate under the ESDP 
framework in EU missions, as well as in NATO, UN, and sub-regional forums 
missions 
4. Improvement of the collaboration between intelligence services in the area of 
sharing information concerning potential risk factors to internal security and 
stability 
5. Support to civilian authorities in the event of emergencies and natural disasters. 
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2. The Romanian Government Defense White Paper 
The Parliament adopted the current White Paper in May 2004.  The document 
mentions the same national interests and risks as did the NSS three years ago, and it 
identifies terrorism in all its forms as the major challenge to Romania’s security (“Carta 
Alba”, 2004, p. 3).  Expressing the country’s commitment to substantially participate in 
NATO and the EU efforts to cope with the new threats and build appropriate capabilities, 
the White Paper mentions the PCC and The Headline Goal as national defense priorities 
(pp. 7-8).  In terms of defense policy objectives, the document mentions four: 
1. Integration into NATO and the EU, and development of Romania’s strategic 
profile within these two organizations 
2. Reform of the military with the aim to develop credible, modern, and efficient 
defense capabilities 
3. Strengthening of the civilian democratic control over the armed forces according 
to the values of the constitutional democracy 
4. Consolidation of the Romania’s status as contributor to the regional and global 
security (p. 11). 
It also states that Romania, while building and upgrading military capabilities, 
takes into consideration both NATO and the ECAP shortfalls, and already offers NATO a 
force package that includes: strategic airlift, reconnaissance, mountain troops, 
mechanized brigades, military police, early warning, electronic warfare, and SEAL 
teams.  Romania’s contribution to the NRF will manifest itself through elite units and 
rapid reaction forces (pp. 14-15).  Indeed, Romanian leaders’ intentions to contribute to 
the full range of NATO missions, from Article 5 to CRO, is specifically expressed in the 
White Paper (p. 14). 
3. Strategic Missions for the Romanian Armed Forces 
As the White Paper directs, the RAF have four main missions and each mission 
implies several derived tasks: 
1. Contribute to Romania’s security during peacetime 
1.1. Defend the country’s airspace 
1.2. Contribute to the security of the maritime space 
1.3. Collect, process, analyze, and disseminate military intelligence 
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1.4. Extraction and evacuation of endangered Romanian citizens from abroad 
1.5. Ensure security of military infrastructure, transportation, and communications 
1.6. Ensure protection of military VIPs, and organize ceremonials and protocol 
activities on Romanian soil 
2. Defend Romania and its Allies 
2.1. Repel military aggression against Romania or its Allies in the framework of 
NATO collective defense 
2.2. Support the functioning of the governmental institutions, and protect the 
population 
3. Strengthen regional and global stability including the use of defense diplomacy 
3.1. Participate in crisis response operations (CRO) 
3.2. Participate in HA operations overseas 
3.3. Participate in operations mounted by ad-hoc coalitions 
3.4. Participate in military cooperation initiatives and implement measures that 
reinforce trust and stability 
3.5. Offer security assistance and support to other states 
3.6. Contribute to national and international efforts to control armament and 
combat WMD proliferation 
4. Support public agencies and local authorities during civil emergencies 
4.1. Participate with forces and logistical support in order to limit and remove the 
effects of disasters 
4.2. Provide support in the event of CBRN accidents 
4.3. Support search and rescue actions for civilian population (pp. 30-32). 
These tasks and sub-tasks are approved by Romania’s Supreme Council of 
National Defense, support the NSS and the Ministerial Directions issued by NATO in 
2003, and are expected to appear in the next MSR (p. 36).  But in order to provide a 
visible and relevant participation along the entire NATO spectrum of conflict, the RAF 
are required to be robust, interoperable, deployabale, mobile, technologically advanced, 
self-sustainable for up to two years, and able to participate in counterterrorist operations 
(p. 37). Table 4 summarizes the aspects we have covered above and presents the strategic 
missions of the RAF that implement Romania’s defense policy priorities. 
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Table 4. Lamb’s model question #2 – RAF principal missions 
 
ROMANIA’S DEFENSE POLICY 
National Security Policy Objectives 
1) Preserving the attributes of the Romanian state, under the specific conditions of NATO 
and EU integrations 
2) Protecting the security of the citizens 
3) Bettering the national defense capability in accordance with NATO standards 
4) Improving the capacity to participate, and actively take part in international actions 
aimed at combating terrorism and organized crime 
Directions of Action for the National Security Policy 
1) Interoperability with NATO forces 
2) Capabilities necessary for conducting peace-keeping, rescue, crisis response, 
combating terrorism, and humanitarian assistance operations 
3) Operationalization of the forces assigned to participate in EU, NATO, UN, and other 
sub-regional organizations missions 
4) Improved intelligence sharing between domestic security and law enforcement 
agencies 
5) Support to civilian authorities in the event of emergencies and natural disasters 
Defense Policy Objectives 
1) Integration into NATO and the EU, and development of Romania’s strategic profile 
within these two organizations 
2) Reform of the military with the aim to develop credible, modern, and efficient defense 
capabilities 
3) Strengthening of civilian democratic control over the armed forces 
4) Consolidation of Romania’s contribution to regional and global security 
MISSIONS FOR THE ARMED FORCES 
1) Contribute to Romania’s security during peacetime 
2) Defend Romania and its Allies 
3) Fortify regional and global stability 
4) Support public agencies and local authorities during civil emergencies 
 
An additional look at the tasks derived from the RAF’s core missions will reveal 
that the EU’s Petersberg missions also are covered by the Romanian defense strategy.  
This should not be a surprise since a brief comparison between the identified threats 
covered in Table 3, and the external risks developed by the NSS and the White Paper 
display obvious similarities. 
Again, NATO, the EU, and Romania essentially expect the same requirements 
from their militaries, a fact that supports our initial assumption concerning the overlap of 
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external security environments.  Continuing the application of the model, we shall 
discover whether their resemblances go further in the SF-employment field. 
4. Missions for General-Purpose Forces 
Now that the specified and implied strategic missions of the RAF are determined, 
the next step of our inquiry is to determine which tasks can be carried out today or in the 
near future by the Romanian General-Purpose Forces or other domestic security services, 
in answer to Lamb’s third question. 
From the outset, one should underscore that Romania has a strong tradition of 
active response in the area of crisis operations.  Being the first former-communist country 
to have joined the PfP, Romanian conventional units – as part of a coalition or under the 
aegis of NATO, the UN, OSCE, or the EU – have participated in twenty-one missions, 
and today deploy more than 1,700 civilians, military observers, civilian police, military 
police, gendarmes, and troops in Africa, Iraq, the Balkans, the Caspian region, and 
Afghanistan (“The Participation of Romania”, 2004). 
According to the White Paper, from 1991 until today, more than 10,000 troops 
have successfully participated in peacekeeping and peace supporting operations, 
humanitarian activities, and combat missions.  In the following Table 5, we address each 
RAF mission (previously specified or implied from NATO missions), and consult the 
White Paper (pp. 25-28) in order to inquire which missions have already been executed 
by the Romanian GPF or other services. Additionally, when necessary, we also provide 
details about who executed the mission, and under what circumstances. 
Continuing the application of Lamb’s model, a glance at Table 5 identifies several 
key missions that have not yet been addressed by the Romanian conventional forces 
during their numerous deployments, or other domestic security services. 
At this point, we have no reason to question the ability of Romania and NATO 
conventional forces to repel conventional aggression, support their populations and 
institutions while under attack, or execute embargo operations, nor do we intend to assess 
the country’s conventional military capabilities to support the state and local authorities 
during civilian emergencies or disasters.  That being said, there are five other strategic 
missions that have never been executed by the RAF, and are open to further study: extract 
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and evacuate Romanian citizens from dangerous places overseas; contribute to CP 
actions; execute CT actions; provide support to civilian SAR activities; and conduct 
initial entry operations. 
 
Table 5. Lamb’s question #3 – RAF mission assessments 
(After the Government’s Defense White Paper) 
Strategic Mission Executed? Circumstances Comments 
Defend airspace Y 24/7 Romanian Air Force 
Secure waters Y 24/7 Romanian Navy 
Execute intelligence 
activities 
Y SFOR; OEF; Iraq MI assets provided area 
HUMINT and IMINT 
Extraction and evacuation 
of civilians 
N Peacetime mission synonym with non-
combatant evacuation in NATO jargon 
Security activities Y Organic elements, gendarmes, MP assets 
Protection of VIPs, 
organize ceremonials, and 
protocols 
Y Task for Protection and Security Service (PSS)
Repel aggression N 
Support the state and  
protect the population 
N 
Tasks during conflict 
Participate in CRO Y IFOR; SFOR; KFOR; Angola 
Participate in HA Y IFOR; SFOR; Somalia 
Support ad-hoc coalitions Y Desert Storm; Iraqi Freedom; Concordia; 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) 
Participate in military 
cooperation initiatives 
Y Angola; Moldova 
Provide security assistance Y Operation Enduring 
Freedom 
Training and 
equipment to ANA 
Contribute to CP actions N Not executed 





Synonym with consequence management in 
NATO jargon 
 
Provide support to civilian 
SAR activities 
N Peacetime task 
Execute CT actions N During Enduring Freedom an Infantry 
Battalion supported Coalition SF in CT actions
Contribute to 
demonstrative packages 
Y Strategic Reserve for SFOR/KFOR executed 
show of force activities 
Conduct initial entry N Synonym with establish a beachhead 
Conduct embargo N Role played by the NRF during its first 
exercise 
Execute AT activities Y ISAF MP in Kabul 
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In addition, there are three other missions that, although practiced by conventional 
elements, involve sub-tasks that are still generally ignored.  Thus, we assess the following 
tasks as well: execute intelligence activities; protection of military and civilian VIPs; and 
AT activities.  This provides us a total of eight RAF strategic missions from which SF 
tasks will subsequently be derived. 
D. MISSIONS FOR ROSF 
We have reached the last step of the application of Lamb’s model and must 
evaluate each proposed ROSF task “in light of the intrinsic nature of special operations 
forces and the roles they can play.” (Lamb, 1995, p. 8) It is true that each SF mission 
should support higher policy goals; nonetheless, in the evaluation of a task’s 
appropriateness for SF elements, one should also take into account the nature of these 
specialized forces, and the guiding principles associated with the evaluation process 
itself. 
1. The Nature of SOF 
Generally speaking, SOF are military elements organized, trained, and equipped 
to conduct special operations that cannot be performed by conventional units.  Trying to 
determine what was special about SOF, Pirnie (1994) contrasted U.S. SOF and GPF 
according to two criteria: typical employment and force characteristics.  He concluded 
that, in terms of typical employment, SOF are employed differently than conventional 
forces because of the aspects listed below: 
1. SOF often break contact with friendly forces, are inserted away from friendly 
support, in sensitive areas or behind enemy lines from where they need to be 
subsequently recovered 
2. SOF elements may plan to avoid contact entirely, or, because of limited resources, 
they are very selective with respect to targets and duration of the combat 
3. Large risks of failure and loss to their forces are common features of special 
operations. Because the margin for error is little, SOF troops reduce risk through 
detailed planning, creative thinking, extensive intelligence support, stealth, 
surprise, and quick limited action 
4. The intent of special operations may focus on exercising leverage (the use of a 
small element to gain operational or strategic advantage); creating indirection (by 
47 
diverting the enemy’s combat power or weakening its sources); or gaining or 
destroying the enemy’s high value targets. 
Force characteristics variables pertaining to personnel, equipment, training, and 
size also differentiate U.S. SOF from the GPF: 
1. SOF operators are rigorously selected, exceptionally motivated, and capable of 
unconventional approaches 
2. SOF often use modified versions of standard equipment, unique items, or 
nonstandard items procured through civilian suppliers 
3. The type of training required for SOF is lengthy, usually joint and often combined 
with foreign forces 
4. Typically, SO dictate a small and discrete force, which represents the most 
obvious difference between SOF and GPF (pp. 6-12). 
Detailing the unique niche capability and value that SOF can offer to the overall 
military architecture and to the NCA, Lamb (1995) holds that “a broad consensus on how 
SOF differ from conventional forces will increase the likelihood that they will be used 
appropriately – SOF will neither be assigned missions that rightly belong to conventional 
forces nor will they be denied missions that they ought to undertake.” (p. 9) 
2. Use and Misuse of SOF 
Lamb also offers a set of axioms that can guide the process of evaluation of 
proposed new tasks for U.S. SOF.  The analyst warns us that a new mission for SOF 
should fit the characteristics of SOF mentioned above and that the fact a military task 
must be carried out does not necessarily mean that SOF should take responsibility for it.  
We consider his observations correct and relevant for our focal organization, and we 
subsequently address them in detail.  Listed below are Lamb’s axioms that provide focus 
to his own model, as it is applied in our work, and aim to further distinguish SOF primary 
missions, collateral missions, and the tasks that should be assigned to GPF. 
1. If the mission has as a necessary condition for success the requirement that SOF 
operators undertake it, then it should be considered a primary SOF mission. 
2. If the odds for mission success significantly increase if SOF perform or 
participate in the mission, then the task might constitute a collateral mission. 
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3. If the mission will be only marginally better performed by SOF, it probably is not 
a SOF mission, unless there are special circumstances.  “As a general rule, such 
mission should not be formally assigned to SOF, and the theater commander in 
chief should make the call on a case-by-case basis as circumstances demand.” 
4. If SOF do not perform the mission as well as or better than conventional forces, 
the mission is inappropriate for SOF, and should be assigned to the GPF or other 
services. 
Developing the issue of collateral tasks, Lamb observed that: 
1. A regular characteristic of collateral missions is that SOF elements cannot 
accomplish them independently 
2. Collateral missions are often derivatives of primary tasks 
3. Many, although not all, so-called emerging missions belong to the collateral tasks 
category 
4. Because SOF resources will remain limited in real terms, before embracing a 
collateral mission SOF leaders should ask whether it is a lesser-included case, 
such as a derivative from competencies required for primary missions 
5. If a collateral mission is a SOF mission only in very special circumstances, SOF 
probably should not undertake the entire mission 
The analyst understands that there are many other factors (i.e. politics and 
budgets) that may play important roles in the assignment of missions to SOF units, but he 
also emphasizes the utility of the rules of thumb we have just mentioned, in term of 
ensuring SOF’s strategic relevance, their harmonious integration with conventional 
forces, and the maximization of their contribution to the national military strategy.  By 
systematically re-evaluating existing SOF missions and capabilities for relevance to the 
country’s security environment, and to the intrinsic nature of SOF, one will allow them to 
pass on to the GPF or other security organizations those tasks that no longer are classified 
as special operations. 
However, in case these guidelines are ignored, and SOF elements lose their focus 
on what makes SOF special, they will be assigned inappropriate missions, which will 
lead in turn to the following risks: 
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1. Inefficient use of specialized assets for conventional tasks, channeling of limited 
resources towards programs of conventional nature at the expense of core 
capabilities, and possible inter-service tensions 
2. Decrease in SOF’s ability to think unconventionally 
3. Threat of reabsorption by the conventional forces (pp. 8-9). 
With Pirnie’s observations on what is specific to SOF compared to conventional 
forces, and Lamb’s comments about SOF tasking, we are ready at this point to evaluate 
and propose new missions and activities for ROSF. 
3. Tasks Assessment 
From the eight remaining strategic tasks mentioned previously, we extract and 
propose new main missions and collateral activities for ROSF. More than being adapted 
to Romania’s national defense policy, these new tasks are expected to fit the general SF 
characteristics, and their assessment should take into account Lamb’s axioms. 
a. Counterterrorism 
CT should constitute the first priority for the ROSF.  The Romanian 1st SF 
Battalion was created as a consequence of 9/11, due to the fact that the Romanian GPF 
did not have deployable counterterrorist capabilities.  This task clearly supports at least 
two National Security Policy Objectives.  The first objective is protecting the security of 
Romanian citizens; the second objective is improving the capacity to participate, and 
actively take part in international actions aimed at combating terrorism.  CT also 
supports at least three Directions of Action for the National Security Policy (1, 2, and 3) 
and three Defense Policy Objectives (1, 2, and 4), which are all presented previously in 
Table 4. 
Internally, although the Romanian Intelligence Service (RIS) is the main 
organization responsible for CT, Article 12 of the Law on Prevention and Combating 
Terrorism states that the RIS can be assisted by specialized assets of the MoND (“Lege 
privind prevenirea”, 2004, p. 8).  While acknowledging the need for clear collaboration 
protocols between the two CT organizations, we emphasize the importance of the task for 
the Battalion both outside the country and, if need be, domestically. 
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Additionally, since CT represents one of the main priorities for the NRF 
and may soon become a task for the EU military, by consolidating CT as the primary 
mission for the SF Battalion, Romania will contribute, with a specialized niche 
capability, to the security of the Alliance, and to the Euro-Atlantic burden-sharing efforts. 
Being the only MoND organization tasked with CT, the 1st SF Battalion 
should train for sub-tasks that include: intelligence operations, attacks against terrorist 
networks and objectives, hostage rescues, recovery of sensitive material from terrorist 
organizations, capture of wanted individuals, and provide CT-related training to allies 
and partners - that is security assistance in the CT field.  These activities also present 
features peculiar to DA and SR. 
b. Counterproliferation of WMD 
The White Paper states that RAF contribute to the national and 
international efforts to counter the proliferation of WMD and arms by controlling the 
export/import flow of its own arsenals, participating in inspections, providing expertise, 
and sharing intelligence (“Carta Alba”, 2004, p. 31).  Since Romanian CP of WMD 
initiatives are limited to these elements only, we propose that ROSF be tasked with the 
activities that link CT with CP.  Because WMD in terrorists’ possession represents the 
acme of terror, the Romanian SF Battalion should be prepared to contribute to CP efforts 
by conducting specific sub-tasks such as: attacks against sensitive WMD targets, destroy 
or disable rogue states or terrorists’ non-WMD assets, collect intelligence related to 
WMD, and provide specific training to needy partners.  Similar to the sub-tasks included 
in CT, CP of WMD involves aspects closely related to DA and SR. 
Finally, CP of WMD will be the principal task that supports at least the 
same defense policy objectives as does CT and will substantiate Romania’s contribution 
to the Euro-Atlantic security, since both NATO and the EU consider proliferation of 
WMD one of the major threats. 
c. Conduct Initial Entry Operations 
For the NRF, conducting initial entry operations equates to establishing 
beachheads for the follow-on forces.  As already practiced by the NRF in Italy, these 
initial entry operations demanded from NATO elite forces to conduct SR (reconnaissance 
and surveillance actions of a strategic and operational value), and DA (small scale 
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offensive strikes against targets of strategic and operational significance).  As we have 
already seen, these last two missions are arguably closely related to one another and 
constitute the bread and butter of all SF units within the Alliance.  They should remain 
principal tasks for the SF Battalion as well.  Moreover, in the event of aggression against 
Romania or its Allies, SF will be ready to provide support to GPF by maintaining a 
capability to conduct these two missions in the territory controlled by the aggressor. 
Although Romanian GPF have military intelligence, SIGINT, HUMINT 
and IMINT capabilities, their proficiency is limited to a tactical and operational levels9.  
By perfecting the abilities to conduct DA and SR, the Romanian SF elements will 
improve their CT and CP skills as well, and will strategically contribute to the future 
initial entry operations of the NRF.  Thus, Romania will participate in the entire spectrum 
of missions that the NRF undertakes, and will achieve its defense policy objective of 
contributing to regional and global security. 
D. Execute Intelligence Activities 
The White Paper states that intelligence collection, processing, analysis, 
and dissemination represent activities that specialized MoND structures carry out in order 
to support military and political decision-makers (“Carta Alba”, 2004, p. 30).  The 
Military Intelligence Directorate (MID) did participate in CRO and provided, via troops 
on the ground and UAVs, area studies and reconnaissance reports for military decision-
makers (pp. 27-28).  Nonetheless, as mentioned above, their capabilities do not cover 
HUMINT requirements at strategic and operational levels, and therefore necessary 
redundancy is lacking in the collection plan of the Romanian deployed MI assets. 
Who then should conduct HUMINT at levels higher than tactical?  One 
option would be for the MID to create its own SR elements, but this would cause an 
unnecessary redundancy, since we have already noticed the extent to which SR is 
associated with CT, CP, DA, and initial entry SF missions.  Another option would be to 
use SF elements for SR at the operational and strategic level, while MI troops conduct 
HUMINT at a tactical level, and IMINT assets, according to their range, will offer 
positive redundancy at tactical and operational levels. 
                                                 
9 The MID uses Shadow 600 UAVs that have a rage of 200 kilometers. 
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In the absence of Romanian strategic IMINT, the Allies can bring their 
assets to ensure redundancy.  In conclusion, the Romanian SF elements should continue 
to train for accomplishing the strategic task of supporting the nations’ military collection 
plan by providing information of operational and strategic significance. 
e. Non-combatant Extraction and  Evacuation 
Addressing extraction and evacuation of endangered Romanian citizens 
from abroad, the White Paper stipulates that RAF execute or participate in this mission 
individually or in cooperation with allies and partners, when non-military means of 
intervention become ineffective (“Carta Alba”, 2004, p. 30).  Both NATO and the EU 
consider this mission a priority (non-combatant evacuation, and respectively rescue 
operations), and, as mentioned previously, the NRF practiced this role in November, 
2003 using Turkish SF as a hostage rescue element, and conventional elements such as 
infantry and paratroopers for evacuation activities.  Since it is a relatively new mission, 
Romanian GPF have not developed the capability for such a specific challenge, but does 
that mean that non-combatant extraction and evacuation (NCEE) should immediately 
become a ROSF task? 
The historical record shows that well trained conventional professional 
troops can conduct NCEE.  For example, in November 1964, more than 500 Belgian 
paratroopers, using 5 U.S. Air Force C-130s, evacuated from Congo nearly 2,000 
European civilians in two days (Odom, 1998, p. 173).  Operation Quick Lift in Zaire, 
September-October 1991 and Operation Turquoise in Rwanda conducted by the French 
in June 1994 constitute two other examples that prove conventional forces’ ability to 
conduct this mission.  That said, in the event that the extraction and evacuation involves 
more than assembling, protecting, and airlifting civilians (i.e., rescuing citizens held 
hostage, terrorist, or WMD threat), the presence on the ground of qualified Romanian SF 
becomes necessary.  But, as Lamb observed earlier, because NCEE could become a SF 
mission only in very special circumstances, the Romanian SF should not undertake it as a 
mission. 
Instead, one of the Romanian paratrooper battalions should be specifically 
tasked with NCEE, while the SF elements remain ready to support it if extraordinary 
contingencies occur.  Thus, the Romanian military will be able to execute an additional 
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EU Petersberg task that is also required by NATO and the country’s leaders.  Using the 
SF only for contingencies, such as a hostage crisis scenario, the Romanian military will 
be prepared for the worst case course of action that can be associated with this mission, 
without, however, formally overburdening the SF. 
If we consider the Romanian SF playing a role in evacuating non-
combatants, albeit in extraordinary circumstances only, it would be fair to address CSAR 
as well.  We have already underscored that the EU capabilities in this field are limited, 
and this could indeed constitute an opportunity for the ROSF to help the Allies in their 
CSAR still modest initiatives. 
However, in light of the U.S. SF operators misuse as ground security 
elements for CSAR activities during the Gulf War, we consider that the task does not fit 
the characteristics of SOF discused in the previous section. CSAR should be assigned to 
SF only during extraordinary circumstances; therefore, according to Lamb’s axiom, it 
should not constitute a stand alone SF task.  The Allies could emulate the example of the 
U.S., pool their resources, and build CSAR dedicated assets such as those that are 
subordinated to AFSOC. 
f. Provide Support to Civilian SAR Activities 
The White Paper explains that, when the resources allow it, the Romanian 
military conducts search and rescue missions in support of the civilian population, in 
collaboration with other agencies with responsibilities in the field (p. 32).  Given the 
country’s mountainous terrain, harsh winters, and limited civilian rotary-wing 
capabilities, the military unit that is tasked with SAR activities is expected to be 
relatively busy.  Because SF elements need to train continuously in order to maintain 
proficiency, and because this task could be only marginally executed better by SF than a 
dedicated conventional element, we propose that this task be addressed by a territorial 
conventional unit. 
g. Protection of VIPs 
As stipulated in the White Paper, the Romanian MoND provides qualified 
personnel as security detail for Romanian and foreign military VIPs on Romanian soil – a 
strategic task for the Protection and Security Service (PSS) (“Carta Alba”, 2004, p. 31).  
Within the same document, one can find the two main sub-tasks of the service: (1) 
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protection of Romanian dignitaries, foreign dignitaries during their stay on Romanian 
soil, and of their families; and (2) security for these dignitaries’ offices and residences.  
In June 2003, the Romanian Parliament adopted a new Law on objectives, goods, and 
values security, and protection of persons that reinforces in Article 3 the PSS two-fold 
task (“Lege privind paza obiectivelor”, 2003, p. 2).  What is not clear though is, who 
should be responsible for protecting Romanian military and political VIPs when they pay 
protocol visits to Romanian troops in dangerous theaters such as Iraq or Afghanistan? 
This last detail has not been acknowledged by the conventional units or 
services.  It is possible that some less cautious officials might move away from the shelter 
provided by the troops they visit, and thus become targets.  Given their knowledge of the 
environment, and their experience in dealing with crisis situations, SF troops, would be 
the appropriate asset for this type of security detail, and they should train for this role.  
Subsequently, the strategic mission of protecting Romania’s leaders will be covered in 
both its aspects internally, by the PSS, and in operational theaters, by the SF. 
Since it is difficult to envisage an alternative to this arrangement without 
efficiency losses, we propose protection of VIPs in operational theaters as a collateral 
mission for ROSF.  Finally, executive protection activities may arguably involve an AT 
aspect as well, mainly due to the reduction of the VIP’s vulnerability to the terrorist threat 
that SF guards would provide (Adams, 1998, p. xvi). 
h. Conduct AT Activities 
The fourth National Security Policy Objective introduced by Romania’s 
NSS aims at improving the capacity to participate, and actively take part in, international 
actions designed to combat terrorism.  As we have already mentioned in the previous 
chapter, combating terrorism comprises both CT and AT.  According to the Romanian 
legislation, antiterrorist intervention comprises all the defensive measures taken prior to 
the occurrence of a terrorist attack that aim at reducing the vulnerability of specific and 
non-specific human factors and material factors. The same document defines 
counterterrorist intervention as the sum of all the offensive measures taken in order to 
capture or kill terrorists, free hostages and reestablish law and order in the event of a 
terrorist attack (“Lege privind combaterea”, 2004, p. 5). 
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Because the CT training missions previously tasked to ROSF are designed 
to improve chosen partners’ CT abilities, one could argue that being better prepared, 
more often than not, is being less vulnerable.  By threatening with serious, credible, and 
immediate reprisals, a highly proficient CT unit will deter terrorists who still have 
survival instincts.  By sharing information about the nuances of the same threat viewed 
from two postures (defensive and offensive), all the agencies involved in countering the 
threat can benefit. 
At this point we agree with Collins (1993) who, as we have mentioned 
previously, looked at both missions as the flip sides of the same coin (p. 25).  Because 
Romanian SF are expected to train others, share lessons learned, protect VIPs, and 
cooperate with domestic CBT agencies, we propose AT to be associated to CT and 
security assistance; consequently, CBT (CT and AT) becomes the primary mission for 
the Romanian SF.  With such a niche capability, the Romanian military will fully support 
NATO’s declared CBT efforts, and ROSF will implement the national security policy 
goal listed above in its entirety. 
E. FIVE MISSIONS FOR ROSF 
We have reached the end of our analysis, and are able to name appropriate tasks 
for ROSF.  Listed below in Table 6 are the resulting missions that, as Lamb advised, are 
appropriate SF tasks, promote Romania’s defense strategy imperatives as stated in the 
NSS and the White Paper, and are adapted to the country’s Euro-Atlantic security 
environment.  Since there are ROSF tasks that support several different defense-related 
strategic goals and missions, Table 6 attempts to present only the self-explanatory 
relationships. 
Of the sixteen tasks formally assigned to the Romanian SF by the SO Doctrine, as 
it has been revealed by the application of Lamb’s model and axioms, only five clearly 
met all the conditions necessary for being considered appropriate for the Romanian SF.  
If one is to categorize these five tasks in light of the dual nature that characterizes 
USSOCOM’s missions, one would conclude that ROSF should not focus the training of 
its members on the unconventional aspect of the equation. 
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Since we cannot identify in the Romanian strategic documents elements that 
resonate with the Truman Doctrine, or with the U.S.’ ambitious strategic goals to assure 
allies and friends, maintain leadership in the global community, and be viewed as an 
indispensable partner (all addressed earlier in Chapter II); it is not surprising that Lamb’s 
modified framework eliminated a portion of the U.S. SOF community’s complex mix of 
missions. 




Supported Romanian Strategic Goals or Missions 
 
 
1. CBT (CT and 
AT) 
Defend Romania and its Allies; Consolidation of the Romania’s 
status as contributor to the regional and global security; Improving 
the capacity to participate, and actively take part in international 
actions aimed at combating terrorism; Offer security assistance and 
support to other states  
2. CP of WMD Contribute to national and international efforts to combat WMD 
proliferation 
3. SR Participate in operations mounted by ad-hoc coalitions; Collect and 
disseminate military intelligence  
4. DA Bettering the national defense capability in accordance with NATO 
standards; Participate in CRO;  
Collateral 
Mission  




Protecting the security of the citizens; Contribute to Romania’s 
security during peacetime; Ensure protection of military VIPs 
 
Accordingly, in the absence of global responsibilities for Romania, ROSF should 
narrow its field of specialization to the activities that orbit around CBT, SR, and DA, and 
try to address, if necessary, UW, FID, and all the other related tasks, in cooperation with 
other NATO Allies.  As Adams (1998) pointed out: 
In many respects, the question of what SOF does or ought to do comes down to 
training time. To expect a single organization, no matter how talented, to 
undertake missions as diverse and complex as those assigned to Army Special 
Forces is to expect the impossible. (p. 305) 
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The other eleven doctrinal tasks are ruled out because either they do not support 
national defense policy objectives, or, in cases where they do, they can be successfully 
carried out by GPF or do not constitute appropriate SF tasks.  The framework also 
revealed the necessity for the RAF to dedicate a highly-trained paratrooper unit – a 
Ranger-type element - to conduct NCEE.  A unit of this type may also provide invaluable 
fire power support to Romanian SF during CT, CP, or DA missions. 
In the determination of the ROSF’s missions, we consider the first phase of our 
organizational redesigning effort complete.  In the next chapter we will continue our 
quest and address the best structural arrangements for ROSF establishment. 
F. SUMMARY 
In this chapter we have focused on substantiating the framework developed by 
Lamb.  Romania’s geopolitical environment is extensively influenced by the North 
Atlantic Alliance and the defense and security initiatives within the EU.  This reality is 
visible within the country’s NSS and the new White Paper of the Government.  These 
two key documents specify the national goals, national security objectives, and the 
strategic missions required from the armed forces. 
A detailed application of the chosen model, and additional help from Lamb’s 
expertise in the field, have produced five missions for ROSF that are at the same time 
easily justifiable and appropriate – CBT, CP of WMD, SR, DA, and VIP security detail 
in operational theaters.  By contrast, the applied method did not indicate the 
appropriateness for ROSF of tasks that belong to the unconventional operations category 
of the U.S. SOF missions.  By limiting the number its tasks, ROSF could finally focus its 
training and doctrine.  From this solid basis, further organizational developments and 























IV. STRUCTURING ROSF 
In this chapter, a new organizational structure has been proposed for ROSF.  This 
recommendation was based on Burton and Öbel’s (1998) organizational model, which 
was helpful in exploring how ROSF should be restructured and adjusted in order to 
become an effective, efficient, and viable defense organization. 
Organizational theory is a positive science that states our understanding 
about how the world operates and contrasts that understanding with a view 
of how the world could possibly operate.  It provides the theoretical 
underpinnings for organizational design.  …Organizational design is a 
normative science with the goal of prescribing how an organization should 
be structured in order to function effectively and efficiently. (p. xviii) 
According to Burton & Öbel, organizational design is both a product and a 
process: it is a product that prescribes how things ought to be within an organization so it 
can attain its goals; and it is a continuous process of organizational learning involving 
errors, adjustments, and exploitation of past experiences (p. xvi).  But since ROSF was 
founded in 2003, its organizational experiences are limited; therefore, proposing a new 
structure would naturally constitute a predominantly prescriptive effort, and less the 
product of past lessons learned. 
In order to avoid this unsatisfying approach, in addition to applying Burton & 
Öbel’s Organizational Consultant design program to ROSF, conclusions are drawn from 
the specific lessons learned from two experienced Allied SF organizations – the U.S. 
Joint Special Operations Command and the British Special Forces Group.  In this regard, 
Lauren (1994) is supportive; he observed that “the richness of the past and the 
experiences of others in different times and places establish a historical context that can 
provide invaluable insights and perspectives on our contemporary concerns.” (p. 45)  In 
other words, in proposing a new organizational structure for ROSF, both consistent 
design rules provided by organizational theory and prescriptions or recommendations 
from the Allies’ experiences in the SF field are taken into consideration.  
As a result of this approach, we have reached the conclusion that ROSF’s 
configuration should become more centralized, encompassing SEAL, SF, Ranger, and 
dedicated aviation assets; moreover, the number of vertical levels should be reduced, and 
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the organization’s complexity decreased through a limited number of tasks.  First, 
Burton and Öbel’s theoretical interpretations set the stage for the application of the 
Organizational Consultant design program.  Second, the program is used to identify 
ROSF’s internal unbalances and provides recommendations for multiple readjustments.  
Third, from the multitude of these suggested improvements we select only those that 
have direct relevance for the organization’s configuration and test their viability in light 
of the institutional experiences recorded in the JSOC and British Special Forces Group’s 
history.  At the end of this process that uses both theoretical and practical instruments, a 
new structure for ROSF will emerge. 
A. THEORETICAL OBSERVATIONS 
According to Burton & Öbel, the key issue in organizational design is to structure 
an organization to meet three paramount criteria: 
1) Effectiveness – an organization is effective if it realizes its raison d’être and 
accomplishes its missions 
2) Efficiency – an organization is efficient when, in providing its products or 
services, it utilizes the least amount of resources 
3) Viability – an organization is viable if it survives over a long period of time (p. 4) 
Central to Burton & Öbel’s approach is the concept of organizational fit.  This 
fundamental concept measures how well organizational structure facilitates, both 
internally and externally, an organization’s coordinated activities.  Indeed, in order to 
obtain coordinated activities and meet the three criteria mentioned above, an 
organization must fit together internally and also fit its external environment (p. 46). 
As previously underscored, developing an organizational design starts with an 
understanding of the strategic goals and missions of the organization.  As depicted in 
Figure 1, these two elements subsequently determine six organizational dimensions, such 
as the boundary10, technology, strategy, size, management style, and climate of the 
organization, which all in turn influence the choice of a new organizational structure (pp. 
12-13). 
                                                 
10 The boundary of an organization separates the individuals or activities that are inside the 




Figure 1. Organizational Context (From Burton & Öbel, 1998, p. 12) 
 
Since ROSF’s organizational goal is to defend Romania’s fundamental interests 
(Special Operations Doctrine, 2003, p. 7), and its proposed strategic missions are the five 
identified in the previous chapter (CBT, CP of WMD, SR, DA, and VIP security detail), 
it can be surmised that implications associated with these missions have a profound 
influence on all the organizational dimensions mentioned above, including ROSF’s 
structure.  However, given the complexity of the organizational context, illustrated in 
Figure 1, and acknowledging that designing an organization may involve thousands of 
possible alternatives, it is desirable to develop a systematic approach that can incorporate 
the organizational knowledge related to the interdependence between the organizational 
dimensions. 
B. ORGANIZATIONAL CONSULTANT PROGRAM 
At this point, Burton & Öbel’s work becomes extremely relevant for this project.  
Their approach is to translate the interdependences that exist between management style, 
climate, size, environment, strategy, and technology – called contingency factors – and 
the organizational structure into meaningful if-then rules11.  In order to facilitate this, 
they developed Organizational Consultant – a computer-based expert system that 
                                                 
11 There are approximately 450 such rules in the authors’ work. An example of such a rule would be: 











operationalizes the theoretical propositions developed in their work, and helps deal with 
millions of design possibilities in a comprehensive manner (p. xix).  By using this 
program, it was possible to diagnose ROSF and then provide recommendations for its 
improvement. 
For diagnostic purposes, Organizational Consultant required answers to sixty 
questions concerning an organization’s current configuration, formalization, complexity, 
centralization, age, size, environment, management style, strategy, and cultural climate.  
Once these questions were addressed, the program used the answers as input data for the 
analysis phase.  It subsequently provided all the unbalanced situations among the 
contingency factors.  This included the situation misfits with recommendations for the 
organization’s configuration, complexity, formalization, and centralization; as well as 
the organizational misfits that compare the recommended organization with that of the 
current organization.  Figure 2 depicts a block diagram of this process. 
 
 
Figure 2. Organizational Consultant’s Method 
 
C. ORGANIZATIONAL DESCRIPTORS 
One cannot fully understand the design program’s outputs without addressing the 
meaning of the variables that describe an organization and their adaptation to ROSF.  
These descriptors include: configuration, formalization, organizational complexity and 
differentiation, centralization, environment, coordination and control, management and 
































lines describe ROSF according to these variables, and constitute, at the same time, the 
foundation for the inputs used in Organizational Consultant. 
1. ROSF Configuration 
According to Burton & Öbel (1998), the configuration of an organization 
specifies “the general principles for dividing work, breaking tasks into subtasks, and 
coordinating activities.” (p. 45)  ROSF’s existing configuration is represented in an 
organizational chart in Figure 3.  In establishing ROSF’s configuration, one of the 
following most common basic configuration could be chosen: simple, functional, 
divisional, matrix, machine bureaucracy, professional bureaucracy, and adhocracy. 
A look at Figure 3 reveals that, in addition to the SF Battalion that is directly 
subordinated to the General Staff, there are SF elements in all three services.  According 
to SO Doctrine (2003), all these SF units are established according to the undetached 
modules, but detachable principle.  The Doctrine states that, within their parent services, 
all the SF-designated units have a distinct individuality and special training programs. 
However, they do not enjoy resource allocation freedom (p. 12). 
Therefore, by doctrine, the current Romanian SF organization comprises several 
units that can form SF taskforces, according to the specific missions they are called to 
carry out.  From this perspective, one can conclude that ROSF have an ad hoc 
configuration.  However, when such taskforces are established, they comprise 
organizations that are themselves military hierarchies belonging to different parent 
services. 
Given the specialization that exists within ROSF in terms of combat missions 
(i.e., psychological operations, air lift, close air support, operations at sea, or actions in 
mountainous terrain; and the geographical distance between different Romanian SF units 
(i.e., paratrooper battalions, the SF battalion, mountain troops, or reconnaissance 
elements), one notices characteristics that provide ROSF functional, divisional, or matrix 
attributes as well. 
For these reasons, briefly expressed above, Organizational Consultant’s question 






































Figure 3. ROSF Organizational Chart 
 
2. Formalization 
Formalization represents the quantity of written rules, and involves measurement 
and the degree of compliance of the employees.  Formalization is one way to obtain 
standardized behavior from members of an organization, and it constitutes a means of 
coordination and control.  Standardization can lead to quality work and generally 
efficient operations.  If the managers of an organization make decisions based on rules, 
procedures, and policies that are in writing, it means that such organizations have higher 
formalization.  While ad hoc structures abhor rules, written rules provide the fundamental 
characteristic of a bureaucracy (Burton & Öbel, 1998, p. 73-74).  All the elements that 
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form ROSF are military organizations, and therefore it is considered that, by definition, 
they display a high degree of formalization. 
3. Organizational Complexity and Differentiation 
Organizational complexity measures the degree of three types of differentiation.  
Horizontal differentiation is greater when there are several small tasks, and specialization 
by experience, training, and education.  Vertical differentiation represents the number of 
hierarchical levels between top management and the bottom of the hierarchy.  Spatial 
differentiation increases when there are many locations of facilities and personnel (pp. 
68-69).  As depicted in Figure 3, there are four vertical levels between the Chief of the 
General Staff and, for example, the ODAs of the SF Battalion.  Given the great number 
of small tasks pertaining to combat activities and the various geographic locations for SF 
units (i.e. cities like Bucuresti, Constanta, Targu-Mures, or Buzau), ROSF’s 
organizational complexity is considered to be high. 
4. Centralization 
Centralization, like formalization, is a means of coordination; it represents the 
degree to which an individual, unit, or level concentrates its formal authority to make 
discretionary choices concerning issues such as: establishing the budget, exercising 
control over evaluations and rewards, being involved in hiring and firing personnel, 
purchasing supplies and equipment, or establishing programs and projects.  While the SF 
Battalion belongs to a centralized chain of command comprising the SF and AT Service, 
and the J3 Directorate, the other SF-designated units are decentralized since it is their 
parent service (Air Force, Army, and Navy) that administers them, and not the SF and AT 
Service. 
5. The Environment 
In Daft’s (2003) view, the organizational environment comprises “all elements 
that exist outside the boundary of the organization and have the potential to affect all or 
part of the organization.” (p. 50)  The previous chapter acknowledged the importance of 
this contingency factor and attempted to adapt ROSF’s missions to its national and 
international security environments.  The purpose of this chapter is also to propose 
adjustments that would increase the necessary fit between the organization and its 
context.  As Figure 1 indicates, organizational configurations should be designed in 
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relation to the environment.  In our case, ROSF’s environment includes factors such as: 
political and military requirements, financial resources, technology advances, 
international developments that may lead to deployment, or the enemy and his actions. 
Four variables – equivocality, uncertainty, complexity, and hostility - capture 
important dimensions of the environment.  Equivocality is the “existence of multiple and 
conflicting interpretations”; it is related to something that the organization has not 
experienced before and measures the organization’s ignorance of whether a variable 
exists in the environment (Daft & Lengel, as cited Burton & Öbel, 1998, pp. 174-175).  
Ignorance of data and cause/effects, and an unknown or unset agenda for the organization 
also are incorporated into the environmental equivocality (p. 175). While uncertainty is 
not knowing the value of a variable or descriptor from the environment (p. 175), 
environmental complexity measures the number of these variables and their 
interdependency.  Finally, hostility measures how benign or malevolent the 
organization’s environment is, and it can vary from a supporting context to a predatory 
environment that threatens the organization’s existence (pp. 176-177). 
Given that ROSF is at an incipient phase with regard to building an effective 
capability, the levels of equivocality and uncertainty are still important.  In addition, from 
peacetime activities to actual special operations, ROSF’s environmental complexity and 
hostility vary from low to extreme. 
6. Coordination and Control 
According to Burton & Öbel (1998), in order to obtain common goals, the smaller 
activities within an organization must be coordinated to accomplish larger tasks. 
Coordination and control comprise two aspects: one is to make sure that enough relevant 
and timely information is available so that organizational members are able to make the 
right decisions, and the second is to make sure that the members actually make the right 
decisions (p. 76). 
The authors have identified four major means to obtain coordination and control: 
formalization, centralization (both were already addressed above), incentives (payments 
and rewards for groups or individuals), and lateral structures (empowered autonomous 
groups).  ROSF’s current structure does not use centralization as a means to coordinate 
all SF elements. 
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7. Management and Leadership Styles 
According to the contingency theory developed in Burton & Öbel’s work, 
management and leadership styles are two other factors that determine an appropriate 
organizational design. Organizational Consultant differentiates between managers and 
leaders and assesses their styles in terms of: preference for delegation (low versus high); 
level of detail in decision making (very detailed versus low); reactive or proactive in 
decision making (reactive versus proactive); decision making time horizon (short term 
related to plans versus long term related to future visions); risk preference (risk averse 
versus risk taking); and the use of motivation and control (monitoring details versus high 
motivation and inspiration) (pp. 92-93). 
8. Organizational Climate 
The climate helps determine the appropriate level of centralization; for instance a 
high level of trust within an organization suggests less formalization and more 
decentralization.  In addition to the level of trust, measuring climate needs to take into 
consideration the following dimensions: the level of conflict, morale, equitability in 
rewards, resistance to change, leaders’ credibility, and scapegoating (pp. 120-121).   
Although the last two descriptors are very difficult to measure and are not central 
to this project’s approach, their definitions help us gain a better understanding of the 
program’s exhaustive recommendations for ensuring organizational fit within ROSF. 
9. The Size of the Organization 
The larger the organization, the more management should increase the level of 
decentralization.  But there are different views on what constitutes a small, medium, and 
large organization and what the correlations between size and organizational structure 
are.  In this project, Burton & Öbel’s (1998) practical and simple approach, which is to 
measure the number of employees adjusted for their level of professionalization or skill 
capability.  Thus, the size category results from the relationship between the total number 
of employees and their professionalization, which is expressed by the proportion of 
advanced degrees or years of specialized training (pp. 152-153). 
Due to the high percentage of SF operators with many years of training, ROSF is 
considered a large organization in Organizational Consultant; however, this parameter 
had little influence on the program’s recommended configuration. 
68 
10. Technology 
“Technology is the information, equipment, techniques, and processes required to 
transform inputs into outputs.” (Robbins, as cited Burton & Obel, 1998, p. 212)  The 
connection between technology and structure first was developed by Joan Woodward 
who demonstrated that, for instance, the administrative component, or nondirect worker 
component within an organization increases with increased technological complexity (p. 
212).  After their literature survey, Burton & Obel found four dimensions along which 
one can measure technology: 
1. Manufacturing, retail, wholesale, or service 
2. Unit, mass, or process production 
3. Routine or nonroutine 
4. High or low divisibility (p. 220) 
Attempting to describe ROSF along these dimensions, the following conclusions 
have been reached.  ROSF is a service defense organization that conducts special 
operations when directed to do so by the NCA.  The service is tailor made for the 
Romanian MoND, and thus it is a unit production technology that, during operations, 
involves nonroutine work with difficult problems.  Because ROSF’s main tasks can be 
divided into smaller, relatively independent tasks, the degree of the organization’s 
technological divisibility is high (pp. 220-224). 
11. Organizational Strategy 
“The fit between the strategy and the organizational structure has crucial 
implications for the performance of the organization.” (Miller, as cited Burton & Öbel, 
1998, p. 241) The strategy represents both ends and means – it includes the specification 
of the overall end goals and defines the means of action needed to achieve these goals (p. 
241).  The debate on “what follows what” with regard to strategy and structure is still 
open.  So far, in this thesis, it has been considered that structure follows strategy, and 
this perspective is in agreement with Burton & Öbel’s conclusions (p. 255).  Attempting 
to categorize ROSF’s strategy choices one must choose among at least five options: 
• Prospector – an organization that almost continually searches for opportunities, 
regularly experiments with potential responses to changes in the environment, 
and innovates, but usually at the expense of efficiency 
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• Defender – an organization that presents a limited area of operation, a narrow 
focus that seldom requires major adjustments in the organization’s technology, 
methods, or structure; instead, primary attention is devoted to improving the 
efficiency of the existing operations 
• Analyzer with innovation – combines the two strategies addressed above by 
entering a new domain only after viability has been shown; in addition 
innovations can run at the same time with the regular activity 
• Analyzer without innovation – once that the organization has moved into new 
products or markets it still maintains an emphasis on its ongoing products; the 
organization’s limited innovation is concerned mostly with the production 
process and generally not with the product itself 
• Reactor – an organization in which top management frequently perceives change 
and uncertainty in the environment, but they are unable to respond effectively. 
They will seldom make adjustments in strategy or structure unless they are forced 
to do so by outside pressures (p. 252). 
In light of the environmental challenges that ROSF must cope with, 
Organizational Consultant recommends that, in addition to ROSF’s focus on the quality 
of the service it provides, the organization should also adopt an open attitude toward 
innovation, which is an analyzer with innovation strategy. 
D. ORGANIZATIONAL CONSULTANT ASSESSMENT 
At this point, all the necessary descriptors required for the Organizational 
Consultant program have been addressed, and some of them have been detailed according 
to the scope of this project.  With this complete, the program can conduct its assessment 
after all the input data, on the variables that describe ROSF, are entered.  Again, the key 
principle beyond Organizational Consultant’s assessments and recommendations is that 
good fit is necessary among the elements that form ROSF’s organizational context 
presented previously in Figure 1. A good fit means better performance, and it will help 
ROSF become effective, efficient, and viable by the time of its operational deployment. 
The final observations and the misfits between the contingency factors, the 
structure, and the characteristics of ROSF that the program identifies are presented in the 
Annex and constitute useful material for deeper analysis.  In this thesis, however, the 
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focus is solely on what should be adjusted in the ROSF’s structure so that the 
organization matches its particular context.  Accordingly, from the Report Summary 
offered by Organizational Consultant, only the elements pertaining to ROSF’s 
organizational misfits and recommendations concerning organizational configuration are 
listed below. 
Organizational misfits compare the recommended organization with the current 
organization.  The following organizational misfits are present: 
Current and prescribed configuration do not match 
Current and prescribed complexity do not match 
Current and prescribed centralization do not match 
Current and prescribed formalization do not match 
Organizational Consultant recommendations for organizational configurations:  
The most likely configuration that best fits the situation has been 
estimated to be a simple configuration.  A simple organization has a flat hierarchy 
and a singular head for control and decision making.  The primary reason for 
recommending a simple configuration is that the organization has extreme 
environmental hostility.  Extreme environmental hostility requires that the 
organization can respond consistently and rapidly to unforeseen challenges.  
Therefore, it must have a simple configuration.  
Additional recommendations: 
The recommended degree of organizational complexity is low 
A highly equivocal environment requires more flexibility 
The recommended degree of horizontal differentiation is low 
The recommended degree of vertical differentiation is low 
The recommended degree of centralization is high. (Organizational 
Consultant Summary Report, Annex A, pp. 6-8). 
 
From the above, it follows that ROSF should adopt a simple configuration, in 
which the top management dominates and assumes responsibility and authority to make 
decisions, coordinate and control, in short - a high degree of centralization.  A simple and 
flexible structure is recommended for better coping with ROSF’s hostile and equivocal 
environment.  It requires a low number of vertical levels, that is a low vertical 
differentiation, (a flat hierarchy), and a reduced number of tasks (low horizontal 
differentiation). 
In the previous chapter, results from Lamb’s framework also concluded that a 
reduced number of tasks was required; in fact, the recommendation was that the number 
of ROSF’s tasks should be reduced from sixteen to five.  A brief look at two NATO 
71 
Allied SF organizations also will support Organizational Consultant conclusions related 
to ROSF configuration. 
E. THE U.S. JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND (JSOC) 
One could argue that JSOC was established in response to incidents such as the 
failed Son Tay, Mayaguez, and Desert One operations.  These events served to strengthen 
the resolve of politicians and top military officials to build an effective joint hostage 
rescue capability.  Questioned by senators about the lessons he had learned from Desert 
One failure, Colonel Beckwith (1983) – the ground commander of the raid – replied:  
In Iran we had an ad hoc affair.  We went out, found bits and pieces, 
people and equipment, brought them together occasionally and ask them 
to perform a highly complex mission.  The parts all performed, but they 
didn’t necessarily perform as a team.  Nor did they have the same 
motivation.  My recommendation is to put together an organization which 
contains everything it will ever need, an organization which would include 
Delta, the Rangers, Navy SEALs, Air Force pilots, its own staff, its own 
support people, its own aircraft and helicopters.  Make this organization a 
permanent military unit.  Give it a place to call home.  Allocate sufficient 
funds to run it.  And give it sufficient time to recruit, assess, and train its 
people.  Otherwise we are not serious about combating terrorism. (p. 326) 
 
United States Special Operations Forces Posture Statement (1993) and the 
subsequent SOF Postures works provide few details about JSOC.  It states that the 
organization was established in 1980 at Fort Bragg, is a sub-unified command of 
USSOCOM, and has the following directives: study requirements and techniques 
pertaining to joint special operation (JSO); ensure equipment standardization and 
interoperability; provide expertise for a standing JSO task force; plan and carry out JSO 
exercises and training; and develop JSO tactics (p. B-5) 
Collins (1987) offers additional insight about the organization and explains that 
the standard U.S. DoD response to questions about JSOC is: 
The U.S. Government has trained forces and equipment from all four 
services to cope with terrorist incidents.  We have also said that command 
and control elements for these forces exist and have been exercised.  
These elements report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as do other command 
and control elements for military operations.  We do not want to comment 
further on any details concerning the circumstances under which these 
forces may be deployed, their identity, or tactics. (p. 21) 
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Originally reporting directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, JSOC also consolidates 
control of, trains, deploys, develops doctrine for, and employs elite hostage rescue and 
other CT and DA elements. 
Figure 4 indicates that JSOC employs nearly 1,000 highly-trained operators, 
enjoys high priority for equipment, and comprises the Delta Force, specialized helicopter 
elements, SEAL Team 6, a communications element, and other aviation assets from the 
2nd Air Division that support as required12 (pp. 21-22). 
Indeed, strategic airlift is provided by conventional aviation assets on a priority 
basis.  JSOC represents a permanent joint organization, with a flat and centralized 




Figure 4. The Organizational Chart of the JSOC 
 
With organic aviation assets, the organization can provide a flexible and 
immediate response and it could constitute a model for ROSF just as the British 22nd SAS 
Regiment represented a conceptual and organizational model for Delta in the late 1970s 
(Beckwith, 1983, p. 101). 
F. THE BRITISH SF 
Created during WWII with the main purpose of conducting raids in the enemy’s 
rear, the Special Air Service (SAS) – one of the world’s most viable SF organizations - 
and its sister organization - the Special Boat Service (SBS) - both integrated into a new 
                                                 
12 This information about JSOC is collected from open sources, which the Pentagon does not confirm 
or deny. 
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Special Forces Headquarters Group in March 1987.  Commanded by a Director of 
Special Forces (typically an SAS brigadier with an SBS colonel as a second-in-
command), the Group constituted the response to a perceived need for closer 
coordination which manifested itself during the Falklands campaign.  The accidental 
friendly fire that caused the death of an SBS marine at the hands of an SAS party 
demonstrated that the presence of uncoordinated SF units within the same area of 
operations was a poor organizational and operational choice. 
With the creation of the joint SF Group - depicted in Figure 5 - the SBS freely 
adopted a new configuration that mirrored that of the SAS (squadrons and troops). 
Concurrently, the possibility of confusion during planning was reduced, wasteful 
redundancy was eliminated, and new techniques and technologies started to spread easier 
within the British SF community (Finlan, 2002, 92-93). 
Unlike the U.S. JSOC, the British SF Group does not have organic aviation assets 
(Kemp, 1994, p. 208).  Nonetheless, as directed, the Royal Air Force (RAF) provides 
specifically trained rotary-wing and C-130 SF squadrons (i.e. 7 and 47 RAF SF 
Squadrons) in support of the Group’s missions (Ratcliffe, 2000, p. 186). 
Moreover, the SAS enjoys a high priority position within the defense 
establishment, and it is the best equipped unit in the British Army: 
The system is brilliant; in effect, the Regiment has carte blanche on weapons 
purchase, and all sorts of other equipment besides.  Thus whatever the SAS wants, 
the SAS gets.  If they want to try a new weapon, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) 
makes sure that they have the opportunity.  And if they like it, then it is purchased 
for them. (p. 67) 
 
 
















As far as the British Government is concerned, since the emergence of 
international terrorism in the 1960s, CBT has been the first priority of the SAS, and all 
four active squadrons from the SAS Regiment – the 22nd - have invariably engaged in this 
role (p. 185).  Figure 6 depicts a detailed organizational specialization of an SAS Sabre 
Squadron, as offered by Kemp (1994, p. 112). 
Again, in addition to the troop-level specialization, each SAS operator must 
successfully complete the Close Quarter Battle (CQB) and Body Guard (BG) courses and 
continuously maintain proficiency in these tasks (Seymour, 1985, p. 458). 
Does the British SF organization fit the recommendations that Organizational 
Consultant provided regarding hierarchical establishments that evolve in challenging 
environments?  Today the SF Group is a joint organization that centralizes command and 
control for SF assets at a brigadier level – an influential position within the MoD.  
Whenever it is required, RAF is ready to provide dedicated aviation assets, in the 
same manner as the entire defense organization shows willingness to keep the SAS the 
best equipped unit in the Army. 
The number of vertical levels is low, and the organization’s reduced number of 
missions and specialties covers the CBT, DA, and SR interrelated fields.  For these 
reasons briefly expressed above, ROSF could follow the example of numerous Allied SF 





Figure 6. Specializations within a SAS Squadron 
 
 
G. NEW ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE FOR ROSF 
From the two case studies addressed above, it is deduced that Burton & Öbel’s 
work not only presents internal theoretical consistency, but also resonates with the 
empirical adjustments recorded in the U.S. and British SF organizational evolutions.  
Exogenous factors such as crises, failures, and accidents, or deliberate decisions made by 
top management led to changes within these two organizations, changes that are today 
supported by the Organizational Consultant design program’s conclusions. 
In light of the prescriptions provided by the application of the program and 
assimilating the lessons learned from the Allies’ past, ROSF enjoy a strong foundation to 










































Figure 7. A New Structure for ROSF 
 
Centralized command and control for ROSF fosters effectiveness and efficiency 
during conflicts as well as in peacetime.  A reevaluation of the SO Doctrine should bring 
under the Special Forces Service (SFS) all the SF capabilities that belong to the Navy, 
Army, and Air Force today and are required to ensure SF operational readiness by the end 
of 2005. 
The SF Service will match authority and responsibility, make sure that resources 
are allocated according to the SF community’s needs, provide joint and combined SO 
doctrines, and create SF Task Forces for internal employment or deployment within 
NATO or EU. Being able to immediately respond to future crises necessitates: 
• Coordinated SEALs and SF elements that can be supported by the fire-power and 
mobility provided by a Ranger-type unit.  The SF Battalion should emulate the 
British SAS, in terms of company-level specialization, reduced horizontal 
differentiation, and narrow span of control within the unit. 
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• Immediately available fixed-wing aircraft that, through specific cooperation 
protocols between the SF Service and the Air Force, would systematically train 
with SF in joint settings and under realistic conditions. 
The simple reorganization depicted in Figure 7 reduces the number of vertical 
layers inside the SF hierarchy, enhances the organization’s flexibility, and proposes a set 
of other marginal improvements that, as Betts (2002) observed, might spell the difference 
between success and failure (p. 155). 
With organic intelligence, aviation assets, and specialized operators, the SFS will 
become a separate and self-sufficient service that will provide a strategic niche capability, 
and respond to the NRF, the European Headline Goal, and Romania’s force structure 
needs. 
H. SUMMARY 
With this chapter we have reached the end of our project aimed at proposing 
justifiable and coherent new missions and structure for ROSF. The adopted 
organizational design method identified several misfits within the organization 
concerning ROSF’s current centralization, configuration, formalization, and complexity.  
The program also recommended adjustments for enhancing the organization’s 
performance. 
The appropriateness of the modifications suggested by the theory concentrated in 
Organizational Consultant is entirely supported by the organizational configurations that 
JSOC and the British SF Group adopted decades ago. For ROSF, a flexible and simple 
joint structure, centralized command and control for all the SF elements, and organic or 
immediately available SF aviation assets will pave the way for a markedly increased 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
In this thesis, two questions were addressed: What are the tasks that should be 
assigned to ROSF, and what are the most appropriate structural arrangements for 
ROSF?  In addressing these questions, an initial assumption was that ROSF’s tasks 
should be derived from Romania’s national defense policy goals and adapted to its 
security environment, but it was noted that the country’s environment changed with its 
integration into the NATO Alliance.  Therefore, it became clear that, in addition to 
policy-driven national imperatives stated in the Romanian National Security Strategy and 
Defense White Paper, the ROSF community needed to be proactive and adapt to the 
military requirements emphasized by the NATO Alliance and EU establishments.  If 
implemented, the conclusions of this thesis and the final recommendations could help 
ROSF fit its environment and achieve operational readiness by 2007. 
In this project, it also has been argued that the structure for ROSF should follow 
from the tasks that the organization is directed to conduct.  What, where, and in what 
circumstances are the three main doctrinal considerations that determine the basic 
configuration of the organization.  Indeed, as a SF capability within the Alliance, ROSF 
should be ready to conduct, anywhere, the five missions detailed in Chapter III - CBT, 
CP of WMD, SR, DA, and VIP security in troubled areas. 
This requires Romanian SF elements to be able to implement structural changes 
that combine centralized command and control with de-centralized execution.  In order to 
dominate any hostile environment, ROSF should tend to become a joint self-sufficient 
organization comprising: SEAL elements, SF, Rangers, organic or immediately available 
aviation assets, and intelligence support, with a reduced number of vertical levels, and 
clear fields of specialization.  In addition, particular attention should be paid to the 
requirements that the Alliance and RAF are expected to meet: mobility, deployability, 
effective engagement, sustainability, efficient command and control, high-technology 
communications, information superiority, coherence, high state of readiness, joint and 
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combined operational skills, flexibility, interoperability, effective intelligence, and timely 
decision-making. 
Undoubtedly, all the structural modifications we have suggested for ROSF and 
the requirements listed above involve changes that require ROSF’s members, from the 
top of the organization to its periphery, to think, feel, and do things differently. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MANAGING ORGANIZATIONAL 
CHANGE 
In The Harvard Business Review and California Management Review, a number 
of experts have published recommendations that are relevant to the discussion of 
transformation in the ROSF.  Kotter (1995) identifies eight steps to transforming an 
organization (p. 61): 
1. Establishing a sense of urgency by identifying potential crises 
2. Assembling and empowering a coalition to lead the change effort, and encourage 
the coalition’s members to work as a team 
3. Creating a guiding shared vision, and developing strategies for achieving that 
vision 
4. Communicating the new vision and strategies using every means necessary; 
fostering consensus and teaching new behaviors by the example of the guiding 
coalition 
5. Empowering others to act on the vision by getting rid of the systems or structures 
that are obstacles to change; encouraging risk taking and nontraditional ideas, 
activities, and actions 
6. Planning for and creating visible short-term improvements; recognizing and 
rewarding active employees 
7. Consolidating improvements using increased credibility, hiring, promoting, and 
developing employees who can implement the vision; producing still more change 
with reinvigorating projects and change agents 
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8. Institutionalizing new approaches by emphasizing the connection between the 
new behaviors and organizational success, and developing the means to ensure 
leadership development and succession. 
Duck (1993) observes that trust is a critical factor for successful change, and, at 
the same time, the most difficult to establish in the midst of change.  Creating a climate 
of trust inside the organization requires (pp. 114-115): 
1. Employee trust – built through predictability (clear and consistent organizational 
goals and rules), and capability (stating the role that each member will play in the 
change process) 
2. Employee empowerment – genuinely inviting everyone to contribute to the 
organization’s desired future. 
For achieving these two requirements the author envisions the creation of a 
Transition Management Team that would have the following responsibilities (pp. 117-
118): 
1. Establish the context for change via organized discussions throughout the 
organization 
2. Stimulate conversation in search of breakthrough thinking and new insights from 
everyone 
3. Provide resources where authority is assigned 
4. Coordinate projects in order to avoid confusion 
5. Protect the change effort’s credibility by ensuring congruence of messages and 
behaviors 
6. Provide opportunities for joint creation of the organization’s future 
7. Anticipate and address people problems by gathering and distributing information 
about the change effort 
8. Prepare the critical mass necessary to replicate and transfer the experience gained 
from the change effort. 
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Finally, Young (2000) offers the following lessons for managing organizational 
transformations (pp. 70-78): 
1. Appoint leaders whose backgrounds and experiences are appropriate for the 
transformation efforts 
2. Follow a focused and coherent plan: create a vision, adopt a new organizational 
structure, establish an accountability system, and modify the organization’s rules 
and regulations 
3. Persevere in the presence of imperfection 
4. Match changes in the external environment with changes in the internal 
environment 
5. Develop and manage communication channels from the top to the bottom of the 
organization’s hierarchy 
6. Do not overlook training and education 
7. Find the right balance between centralization and de-centralization concerning 
decision-making authority. 
Several of the recommendations provided by these authors might be useful in 
managing ROSF’s transformation process.  However, in order to foster a proactive 
environment and creative thinking, the members of the organization, at every level, must 
become engaged, with their hearts and minds, in the change process.  The sense of 
urgency previously mentioned already has been created by the deadline imposed on 
ROSF to achieve initial operational capability (one deployable company) by the end of 
2005.  It is recommended that the other abovementioned prescriptions concerning 
organizational trust, communication, credibility, management, or accountability be 
addressed in combination with the conclusions provided by Organizational Consultant 
which have not been developed in this thesis (climate, management and leadership style, 
or strategy).  These areas provide direction for further research. 
C. RELEVANCE OF THE PROJECT 
One may argue that the methodology used in this project could be applied, 
partially or entirely, to numerous types of defense or security organizations.  (1) Linking 
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an organization’s tasks to its environment, higher policy imperatives, and other 
establishments’ tasks; (2) theoretically deducing what the design of the organization 
should be like; and, for additional support, (3) identifying equivalent design 
characteristics within other similar organizations – all create a solid base for 
organizational re-tasking and re-structuring efforts. 
This methodology may be particularly helpful for new NATO members, such as 
Bulgaria and Hungary, who intend to build SF capabilities, but face similar difficulties in 
determining justifiable mission tasking and effective force configuration. 
It is a sincere desire that the conclusions and recommendations resulting from this 
project will be helpful to ROSF in becoming an effective, efficient, and viable SF 
instrument by the end of 2007, specialized in a field that does not threaten the General-
Purpose Forces or other agencies’ areas of responsibility, with advanced skills that will 
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ANNEX 
ORGANIZATIONAL CONSULTANT REPORT SUMMARY - Romanian Special 
Forces 
 
INPUT DATA SUMMARY  
 
The description below summarizes and interprets your answers to the questions 
about your organization and its situation. It states your answers concerning the 
organization's current configuration, complexity, formalization, and centralization. Your 
responses to the various questions on the contingencies of age, size, technology, 
environment, management style, cultural climate and strategy factors are also given. The 
write-up below summarizes the input data for the analysis.  
 
- Romanian Special Forces has an other configuration (cf 100). 
- Romanian Special Forces has a very large number of different jobs (cf 100). 
- Of the employees at Romanian Special Forces 51 to 75 % have an advanced 
degree or many years of special training (cf 100). 
- Romanian Special Forces has 3 to 5 vertical levels separating top management 
from the bottom level of the organization (cf 100). 
- The mean number of vertical levels is 3 to 5 (cf 100). 
- Romanian Special Forces has 3 to 5 separate geographic locations (cf 100). 
- Romanian Special Forces' average distance of these separate units from the 
organization's headquarters is 101 to 500 miles (cf 100). 
- More than 90 % of Romanian Special Forces's total workforce is located at these 
separate units (cf 100). 
- Job descriptions are available for all employees, including senior management 
(cf 100). 
- Where written job descriptions exist, the employees are supervised closely to 
ensure compliance with standards set in the job description (cf 100). 
- The employees are allowed to deviate very little from the standards (cf 100). 
- 81 to 100 % non-managerial employees are given written operating instructions 
or procedures for their job (cf 100). 
- The written instructions or procedures given are followed to a very great extent 
(cf 100). 
- Supervisors and middle managers are to a little extent free from rules, 
procedures, and policies when they make decisions (cf 100). 
- More than 80 % of all the rules and procedures that exist within the organization 
are in writing (cf 100). 
- Top Management is not involved in gathering the information they will use in 
making decisions (cf 100). 
- Top management participates in the interpretation of more than 80 % of the 
information input (cf 100). 
- Top management directly controls 0 to 20 % of the decisions executed (cf 100). 
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- The typical middle manager has little discretion over establishing his or her 
budget (cf 100). 
- The typical middle manager has little discretion over how his/her unit will be 
evaluated (cf 100). 
- The typical middle manager has great discretion over the hiring and firing of 
personnel (cf 100). 
- The typical middle manager has great discretion over personnel rewards - (ie, 
salary increases and promotions) (cf 100). 
- The typical middle manager has some discretion over purchasing equipment and 
supplies (cf 100). 
- The typical middle manager has some discretion over establishing a new project 
or program (cf 100). 
- The typical middle manager has some discretion over how work exceptions are 
to be handled (cf 100). 
- Romanian Special Forces has 500 employees (cf 50). 
- Romanian Special Forces' age is young (cf 100). 
- Romanian Special Forces' ownership status is public (cf 100). 
- Romanian Special Forces has few different products (cf 100). 
- Romanian Special Forces has few different markets (cf 100). 
- Romanian Special Forces only operates in one country (cf 100). 
- Romanian Special Forces has no different products in the foreign markets (cf 
100). 
- Romanian Special Forces' major activity is categorized as service (cf 100). 
- Romanian Special Forces has a specialized customer-oriented service 
technology (cf 100). 
- Romanian Special Forces has a medium routine technology (cf 100). 
- Romanian Special Forces' technology is highly divisible (cf 100). 
- Romanian Special Forces' technology dominance is average (cf 100). 
- Romanian Special Forces has either planned or already has an advanced 
information system (cf 100). 
- Romanian Special Forces' environment is complex (cf 100). 
- The uncertainty of Romanian Special Forces' environment is high (cf 100). 
- The equivocality of the organization's environment is high (cf 100). 
- Romanian Special Forces' environment is extremely hostile (cf 100). 
- Top management prefers to make decisions in a way that is not specified (cf 
100). 
- Top management primarily prefers to make both long-term and short-time 
decisions (cf 100). 
- Top management has a preference for medium detailed information when 
making decisions (cf 100). 
- Top management has a preference for some proactive actions and some reactive 
actions (cf 100). 
- Top management risk profile is not known (cf 100). 
- Top management has a preference for a combination of motivation and control 
(cf 100). 
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- Romanian Special Forces operates in an industry with a medium capital 
requirement (cf 100). 
- Romanian Special Forces has a low product innovation (cf 100). 
- Romanian Special Forces has an undetermined level of process innovation (cf 
100). 
- Romanian Special Forces has a high concern for quality (cf 100). 
- Romanian Special Forces' price level is undetermined relative to its competitors 
(cf 100). 
- The level of trust is medium (cf 100). 
- The level of conflict is medium (cf 100). 
- The employee morale is medium (cf 100). 
- Rewards are given in a not known fashion (cf 100). 
- The resistance to change is not known (cf 100). 
- The leader credibility is not known (cf 100). 
- The level of scapegoating is not known (cf 100). 
 
THE SIZE  
 
The size of the organization - large, medium, or small - is based upon the number 
of employees, adjusted for their level of education or technical skills.  
 
Based on the answers you provided, it is most likely that your organization's size 
is large (cf 25). 
 
Between 51 and 75 % of the people employed by Romanian Special Forces have a 
high level of education. Adjustments are made to this effect. The adjusted number of 
employees is lower than 2,000 but greater than 1,000 and Romanian Special Forces is 
categorized as large. However, for this adjusted number this size does not have a major 
effect on the organizational structure. 
 
THE CLIMATE  
 
The organizational climate effect is the summary measure of people and behavior.  
 
Based on the answers you provided, it is most likely that the organizational 
climate is a developmental climate (cf 49). 
 
The developmental climate is characterized as a dynamic, entrepreneurial and 
creative place to work. People stick their necks out and take risks. The leaders are 
considered to be innovators and risk takers. The glue that holds organizations together is 
commitment to experimentation and innovation. The emphasis is on being on the leading 
edge. Readiness for change and meeting new challenges are important. The organization's 
long-term emphasis is on growth and acquiring new resources. Success means having 
unique and new products or services and being a product or service leader is important. 
The organization encourages individual initiative and freedom. 
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When the organization has a high to medium level of trust it is likely that the 
organization has a developmental climate. Employees with a medium morale is 
frequently one element of a developmental climate. 
 
THE MANAGEMENT STYLE  
The level of management's microinvolvement in decision making is the summary 
measure of management style. Leaders have a low preference for microinvolvement; 
managers have a high preference for microinvolvement.  
 
Based on the answers you provided, it is most likely that your management profile 
has a medium preference for microinvolvement (cf 86). 
 
Management has both a short-time and long-term horizon when making decisions, 
which characterizes a preference for a medium microinvolvement. Since the management 
has a preference for medium detailed information when making decisions a medium 
preference for microinvolvement characterization is appropriate. The management of 
Romanian Special Forces has a preference for taking actions on some decisions and being 
reactive toward others. This will lead toward a medium preference for microinvolvement. 
Management has a preference for using both motivation and control to coordinate the 
activities, which leads toward a medium preference for microinvolvement. 
 
THE STRATEGY  
 
The organization's strategy is categorized as one of either prospector, analyzer 
with innovation, analyzer without innovation, defender, or reactor. These categories 
follow Miles and Snow's typology. Based on your answers, the organization has been 
assigned to a strategy category. This is a statement of the current strategy; it is not an 
analysis of what is the best or preferred strategy for the organization.  
 
Based on the answers you provided, it is most likely that your organization's 
strategy is an analyzer with innovation strategy (cf 80). 
 
It could also be: a defender (cf 72). 
 
It could also be: an analyzer without innovation (cf 72). 
 
An organization with an analyzer with innovation strategy is an organization that 
combines the strategy of the defender and the prospector. It moves into the production of 
a new product or enters a new market after viability has been shown. But in contrast to an 
analyzer without innovation, it has innovations that run concurrently with the regular 
production. It has a dual technology core. 
An organization with a medium capital investment is likely to have some 
capabilities rather fixed, but can also adjust. The analyzer with innovation which seeks 
new opportunities but also maintains its profitable position is appropriate. For a medium 
routine technology, Romanian Special Forces has some flexibility. It is consistent with an 
analyzer with innovation strategy. With a concern for high quality an analyzer with 
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innovation strategy is a likely strategy for Romanian Special Forces. With top 
management preferring a medium level of microinvolvement top management wants 
some influence. This can be obtained via control over current operations. Product 
innovation should be less controlled. The strategy is therefore likely to be analyzer with 
innovation.  
An organization with an analyzer without innovation strategy is an organization 
whose goal is to move into new products or new markets only after their viability has 
been shown yet maintains an emphasis on its ongoing products. It has limited innovation 
related to the production process; generally an analyzer without innovation does not have 
product innovation. 
The capital requirement of Romanian Special Forces is not high, which is 
consistent with an analyzer without innovation strategy. With a concern for high quality 
an analyzer without innovation strategy is a likely strategy for Romanian Special Forces.  
 
An organization with a defender strategy is an organization that has a narrow 
product market domain. Top managers in this type of organization are expert in their 
organization's limited area of operation but do not tend to search outside their domains 
for new opportunities. As a result of this narrow focus, these organizations seldom need 
to make major adjustments in their technology, structure, or methods of operation. 
Instead, they devote primary attention to improving the efficiency of their existing 
operations. 
Romanian Special Forces has few products. It needs to defend these products well 
in the marketplace. Viability depends on being successful with these limited activities. 
With a concern for high quality a defender strategy is a likely strategy for Romanian 
Special Forces.  
 
An organization with an analyzer without innovation strategy is an organization 
whose goal is to move into new products or new markets only after their viability has 
been shown yet maintains an emphasis on its ongoing products. It has limited innovation 
related to the production process; generally an analyzer without innovation does not have 
product innovation. 
The capital requirement of Romanian Special Forces is not high, which is 
consistent with an analyzer without innovation strategy. With a concern for high quality 
an analyzer without innovation strategy is a likely strategy for Romanian Special Forces. 
 
THE CURRENT ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS  
 
Based on your answers, the organization's complexity, formalization, and 
centralization have been calculated. This is the current organization. Later in this report, 
there will be recommendations for the organization.  
 
The current organizational complexity is high (cf 100). 
 
The current horizontal differentiation is high (cf 100). 
 
The current vertical differentiation is low (cf 100). 
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The current spatial differentiation is medium (cf 100). 
 
The current centralization is medium (cf 100). 
 
The current formalization is high (cf 100). 
 
The current organization has been categorized with respect to formalization, 
centralization, and complexity. The categorization is based on the input you gave and 
does not take missing information into account. 
 
SITUATION MISFITS  
 
A situation misfit is an unbalanced situation among the contingency factors of 
management style, size, environment, technology, climate, and strategy.  
 
The following misfits are present: (cf 100). 
 
Romanian Special Forces has a low product innovation but does not have a 
certain environment.  This situation calls for a review and suggests that the organization 
consider greater product innovation. Low product innovation means the same products 
are available for an extended period.   In a certain environment with little change in 
customer demands and preferences, there is little need for new products.  But, with 
increasing uncertainty in customer demand, new competitor strategies, possible 
governmental actions, shifting customer tastes, etc., current products are likely to be 
mismatched with this changed environment.   New products and innovation will likely be 
required to adapt and meet the emerging needs and opportunities of the new environment. 
Romanian Special Forces has both an analyzer strategy and few products. 
Generally, more products are required for an analyzer. A few products may be reasonable 
in the short run, but an analyzer should be in constant consideration of new possibilities. 
When a few, unchanging products become the norm, the analyzer should broaden its 
scope of new opportunities. 
 
ORGANIZATIONAL CONSULTANT RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
Based on your answers about the organization, its situation, and the conclusions 
with the greatest certainty factor from the analyses above  Organizational Consultant has 
derived recommendations for the organization's configuration, complexity, formalization, 
and centralization. There are also recommendations for coordination and control, the 
appropriate media richness for communications, and incentives. More detailed 
recommendations for possible changes in the current organization are also provided.  
 
ORGANIZATIONAL CONFIGURATIONS  
 
The most likely configuration that best fits the situation has been estimated to be a 
simple configuration (cf 70). 
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It is certainly not: a machine bureaucracy (cf -100). 
 
A simple organization has a flat hierarchy and a singular head for control and 
decision making. 
The primary reason for recommending a simple configuration is that the 
organization has extreme environmental hostility. Extreme environmental hostility 
requires that the organization can respond consistently and rapid to unforeseen 
challenges. Therefore, it must have a simple configuration.  
 
When the organization is confronted with hostility, it cannot be a machine 
bureaucracy. A machine bureaucracy cannot act appropriately when unexpected events 
occur. 
 
ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS  
 
The recommended degree of organizational complexity is low (cf 68). 
 
Not much is known about the environment since both the environmental 
uncertainty and the environmental equivocality of Romanian Special Forces are high. In 
this situation, the organizational complexity should be low. This allows the organization 
to adapt quickly. When the environmental hostility of Romanian Special Forces is high, 
organizational complexity should be low.  
 
The recommended degree of horizontal differentiation is low (cf 68). 
 
The recommended degree of vertical differentiation is low (cf 86). 
 
The recommended degree of formalization is low (cf 70). 
 
Since the set of variables in the environment that will be important is not known 
and since it is not possible to predict what will happen, no efficient rules and procedures 
can be developed, which implies that Romanian Special Forces' formalization should be 
low. When environmental hostility is high formalization should be low. A developmental 
climate in the organization requires a low level of formalization.  
 
The recommended degree of centralization is high (cf 77). 
 
There is evidence against it should be: low (cf -6). 
 
When there is a medium capital requirement and the product innovation is low, as 
is the situation for Romanian Special Forces, centralization should be high to obtain 
efficiency. When the environment is extremely hostile, top management must take 
prompt action and centralization must be high. Because Romanian Special Forces has an 
advanced information system, centralization can be greater than it could otherwise.  
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Romanian Special Forces' span of control should be moderate (cf 64). 
 
Since Romanian Special Forces has some technology routineness, it should have a 
moderate span of control.  
 
Romanian Special Forces should use media with high media richness (cf 85). 
The information media that Romanian Special Forces uses should provide a large 
amount of information (cf 85). 
 
Incentives should be based on results (cf 85). 
 
Romanian Special Forces should use meetings as means for coordination and 
control (cf 92). 
 
When the environment of Romanian Special Forces has high equivocality, high 
uncertainty, and high complexity, coordination and control should be obtained through 
integrators and group meetings. The richness of the media should be high with a large 
amount of information. Incentives must be results based. Top management should play 
the central role in coordinating and controlling the activities of the organization as well as 
making strategic and operating decisions. When the organization has a developmental 
climate, coordination should be obtained using planning, integrators and meetings.  
Incentives could be results based with an individual orientation. An organization with a 
developmental climate will likely have to process a large amount of information and will 
need information media with high richness. 
Top management should make many decisions. However, many individuals 
should be involved in gathering information and implementing those decisions. 
 
ORGANIZATIONAL MISFITS  
 
Organizational misfits compare the recommended organization with the current 
organization.  
 
The following organizational misfits are present: (cf 100). 
 
Current and prescribed configuration do not match. 
Current and prescribed complexity do not match. 
Current and prescribed centralization do not match. 
Current and prescribed formalization do not match. 
 
MORE DETAILED RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
There are a number of more detailed recommendations (cf 100). 
 
You may consider decreasing the number of positions for which job descriptions 
are available. 
You may consider supervising the employees less closely. 
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You may consider allowing employees more latitude from standards. 
You may consider fewer written job descriptions. 
Managerial employees may be asked to pay less attention to written instructions 
and procedures. 
You may give supervisors and middle managers fewer rules and procedures. 
You may consider having fewer rules and procedures put in writing. 
Top management may consider gathering the information needed for decision 
making themselves. 
Top management may control the execution of decisions more actively. 
You may give middle managers less discretion on hiring and firing personnel. 
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GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS 
ACC  Air Combat Command 
ADCON Administrative Control 
AFSOC Air Force Special Operations Command 
ANA  Afghani National Army 
AO  Area of Operations 
ARSF  Army Special Forces 
AT  Antiterrorism 
 
CA  Civil Affairs 
CAO  Civil Affairs Operations 
CBT  Combating Terrorism 
CBRN  Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear 
CD  Counterdrug 
CIA  Central Intelligence Agency 
C4I  Command Control Communications Computer and Intelligence 
CFSP  Common Foreign and Security Policy 
CM  Countermine 
CP of WMD Counterproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction 
CRO  Crisis Response Operations 
CSAR  Combat Search and Rescue 
CT  Counterterrorism 
 
DA  Direct Action 
DIA  Defense Intelligence Agency 
DoD  Department of Defense (U.S.) 
 
ECAP  European Capabilities Action Plan  
EU  European Union 
EUMS  European Union Military Staff 
ESDP  European Security and Defense Policy 
 
FID  Foreign Internal Defense 
FY  Fiscal Year 
 
GPF  General-Purpose Forces 
GWT  Global War on Terror 
 
HA  Humanitarian Assistance 
HUMINT Human Intelligence 
 
IFOR  Implementation Force (Bosnia) 
ILINT  Imagery Intelligence 
IO  Information Operations 
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ISAF  International Security Assistance Force (Afghanistan) 
IW  Information Warfare 
 
JSOC  Joint Special Operations Command (U.S.) 
 
KFOR  Kosovo Force 
 
MAP  The Membership Action Plan 
MI  Military Intelligence 
MID  Military Intelligence Directorate (Romania) 
MoND  Ministry of National Defense (Romania) 
MP  Military Police 
MSR  Military Strategy of Romania 
MTT  Mobile Training Team 
 
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NBC  Nuclear Biological Chemical 
NCA  National Command Authority 
NCEE  Non-combattant Extraction and Evacuation 
NCO  Non-commissioned Officers 
NSS  National Security Strategy 
NMS  National Military Strategy 
NRF  NATO Response Force 
 
OCI  Office of Coordinator of Information 
OCPW  Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare 
ODA  Operational Detachment Alpha 
OEF  Operation Enduring Freedom 
OSCE  Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
OSS  Office of Strategic Services 
 
PAD  Program Action Directive 
PCC  Prague Capabilities Commitment 
PfP  Partnership for Peace 
PSS  Protection and Security Service (Romania) 
PSYOP Psychological Operations 
 
RAF  Romanian Armed Forces 
ROSF  Romanian Special Forces 
 
SAS  Special Air Service (U.K.) 
SAR  Search and Rescue 
SBS  Special Boat Service (U.K.) 
SEAL  Sea, Air, and Land Forces (Navy) 
SF  Special Forces 
SFOR  Stabilization Force (Bosnia) 
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SIGINT Signals Intelligence 
SO  Special Operations 
SOF  Special Operations Forces 
SOS  Strategic Objectives Security 
SR  Special Reconnaissance 
SHAPE NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe 
 
UAV  Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
U.K.  United Kingdom 
UN  United Nations 
USASOC United States Army Special Operations Command 
USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command 
UW  Unconventional Warfare 
 
VIP  Very Important Person 
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